[Note: Numbers in brackets refer
to the printed pages of the Emanuel Law Outline where the topic is discussed.]
Emanuel Law Outlines
Constitutional Law
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
I. THREE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Three standards: There are three
key standards of review which reappear constantly throughout Constitutional
Law. When a court reviews the constitutionality of government action, it is
likely to be choosing from among one of these three standards of review: (1)
the mere rationality standard; (2) the strict scrutiny standard; and (3) the
middle-level review standard. [2]
1. Mere rationality: Of the three
standards, the easiest one to satisfy is the "mere rationality"
standard. When the court applies this "mere rationality" standard,
the court will uphold the governmental action so long as two requirements
are met:
a. Legitimate state objective:
First, the government must be pursuing a legitimate govern mental
objective. This is a very broad concept - practically any type of health,
safety or "general welfare" goal will be found to be
"legitimate."
b. Rational relation: Second,
there has to be a "minimally rational relation" between the
means chosen by the government and the state objective. This requirement,
too, is extremely easy to satisfy: only if the government has acted in a
completely "arbitrary and irrational" way will this rational
link between means and end not be found.
b. Necessary means: Second, the
means chosen by the government must be "necessary" to achieve
that compelling end. In other words, the "fit" between the means
and the end must be extremely tight. (It's not enough that there's a
"rational relation" between the means and the end, which is
enough under the "mere rationality" standard.)
B. Consequences of choice: The
court's choice of one of these standards of review has two important
consequences: [3]
b. Strict scrutiny: By contrast,
if the court applies "strict scrutiny," then the governmental
body whose act is being attacked has the burden of persuading the court
that its action is constitutional.
2. Effect on outcome: Second, the
choice of review standard has a very powerful effect on the actual outcome.
Where the "mere rationality" standard is applied, the governmental
action will almost always be upheld. Where "strict scrutiny" is
used, the governmental action will almost always be struck down. (For
instance, the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to any classification
based on race, and has upheld only one such strictly scrutinized racial
classification in the last 50 years.) Where middle-level scrutiny is used,
there's roughly a 50-50 chance that the governmental action will be struck
down.
UL>
a. Exam Tip: So when you're writing
an exam answer, you've got to concentrate exceptionally hard on choosing the
correct standard of review. Once you've determined that a particular
standard would be applied, then you might as well go further and make a
prediction about the outcome: if you've decided that "mere
rationality" applies, you might write something like, "Therefore,
the court will almost certainly uphold the governmental action." If
you've chosen strict scrutiny, you should write something like,
"Therefore, the governmental action is very likely to be struck
down."
C. When used: Here is a quick
overview of the entire body of Constitutional Law, to see where each of these
review standards gets used: [3]
a. Dormant Commerce Clause:
First, the "mere rationality" test is the main test to determine
whether a state regulation that affects interstate commerce violates the
"Dormant Commerce Clause." The state regulation has to pursue a
legitimate state end, and be rationally related to that end. (But there's
a second test which we'll review in greater detail later: the state's
interest in enforcing its regulation must also outweigh any burden imposed
on interstate commerce, and any discrimination against interstate
commerce.)
b. Substantive due process: Next
comes substantive due process. So long as no "fundamental right"
is affected, the test for determining whether a governmental act violates
substantive due process is, again, "mere rationality." In other
words, if the state is pursuing a legitimate objective, and using means
that are rationally related to that objective, the state will not be found
to have violated the substantive Due Process Clause. So the vast bulk of
economic regulations (since these don't affect fundamental rights) will be
tested by the mere rationality standard and almost certainly upheld.
c. Equal protection: Then, we
move on to the equal protection area. Here, "mere rationality"
review is used so long as: (1) no suspect or quasi-suspect classification
is being used; and (2) no fundamental right is being impaired. This still
leaves us with a large number of classifications which will be judged
based on the mere rationality standard, including: (1) almost all economic
regulations; (2) some classifications based on alienage; and (3) rights
that are not "fundamental" even though they are very important,
such as food, housing, and free public education. In all of these areas,
the classification will be reviewed under the "mere rationality"
standard, and will therefore almost certainly be upheld.
a. Substantive due
process/fundamental rights: First, where a governmental action affects
fundamental rights, and the plaintiff claims that his substantive due
process rights are being violated, the court will use strict scrutiny. So
when the state impairs rights falling in the "privacy" cluster
of marriage, child-bearing, and child-rearing, the court will use strict
scrutiny (and will therefore probably invalidate the governmental
restriction). For instance, government restrictions that impair the right
to use contraceptives receive this kind of strict scrutiny.
b. Equal protection review: Next,
the court uses strict scrutiny to review a claim that a classification
violates the plaintiff's equal protection rights, if the classification
relates either to a suspect classification or a fundamental right.
"Suspect classifications" include race, national origin, and
(sometimes) alienage. "Fundamental rights" for this purpose
include the right to vote, to be a candidate, to have access to the
courts, and to travel interstate. So classifications that either involve
any of these suspect classifications or impair any of these fundamental
rights will be strictly scrutinized and will probably be struck down.
c. Freedom of expression: Next,
we move to the area of freedom of expression. If the government is
impairing free expression in a content-based way, then the court will use
strict scrutiny and will almost certainly strike down the regulation. In
other words, if the government is restricting some speech but not others,
based on the content of the messages, then this suppression of expression
will only be allowed if necessary to achieve a compelling purpose (a
standard which is rarely found to be satisfied in the First Amendment area). Similarly, any
interference with the right of free association will be strictly
scrutinized.
d. Freedom of
religion/Free Exercise Clause: Lastly, the court will use strict scrutiny
to evaluate any impairment with a person's free exercise of religion. Even
if the government does not intend to impair a person's free exercise of
his religion, if it substantially burdens his exercise of religion the
government will have to give him an exemption from the
otherwise-applicable regulation unless denial of an exemption is necessary
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
a. Equal protection/semi-suspect:
First, middle-level review will be used to judge an equal protection
claim, where the classification being challenged involves a semi-suspect
trait. The two traits which are considered semi-suspect for this purpose
are: (1) gender; and (2) illegitimacy. So any government classification
based on gender or ilegitimacy will have to be "substantially
related" to the achievement of some "important"
governmental interest.
c. Free
expression/non-content-based: Finally, in the First Amendment area we use a standard
similar (though not identical) to the middle-level review standard to
judge government action that impairs expression, but does so in a
non-content-based manner. This is true, for instance, of any
content-neutral "time, place and manner" regulation.
Chapter 2
THE SUPREME COURT'S AUTHORITY AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S AUTHORITY AND
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
A. Marbury principle: Under Marbury v. Madison, it is the Supreme Court, not
Congress, which has the authority and duty to declare a congressional statute
unconstitutional if the Court thinks it violates the Constitution. [7 - 8]
B. Supreme Court
review of state court decision: The Supreme Court may review state court
opinions, but only to the extent that the decision was decided based on
federal law. [9 - 10]
1. "Independent and adequate
state grounds": Even if there is a federal question in the state court
case, the Supreme Court may not review the case if there is an
"independent and adequate" state ground for the state court's
decision. That is, if the same result would be reached even had the state
court made a different decision on the federal question, the Supreme Court
may not decide the case. This is because its opinion would in effect be an
"advisory" one. [10]
a. Violations of state and
federal constitutions: If a state action violates the same clause of both
state and federal constitutions (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause of each), the state court
decision may or may not be based on an "independent" state
ground. If the state court is saying, "This state action would
violate our state constitution whether or not it violated the federal
constitution," that's "independent." But if the state court
is saying, "Based on our reading of the constitutional provision
(which we think has the same meaning under both the state and federal
constitutions), this state action violates both constitutions," this
is not
"independent," so the Supreme Court may review the state court
decision. [11]
2. Review limited to decisions of
highest state court: Federal statutes limit Supreme Court review to
decisions of the highest state court available. But this does not mean that
the top-ranking state court must have ruled on the merits of the case in
order for the Supreme Court to review it. All that is required is that the
case be heard by the highest state court available to the petitioner.
(Example: A state trial court finds a particular state statute to be valid
under the federal Equal Protection Clause. An intermediate appellate court
in the state affirms; the highest state court refuses to hear an appeal from
the affirmance. As a matter of both the federal judicial power and federal
statutes, the Supreme Court may hear this case, because the intermediate
appellate court was the highest court "available" to the
petitioner.)
C. Federal judicial power: Article III, Section 2 sets out the federal judicial
power. This includes, among other things: (a) cases arising under the
Constitution or the "laws of the U.S." (i.e., cases posing a
"federal question"); (b) cases of admiralty; (c) cases between two
or more states; (d) cases between citizens of different states; and (e) cases
between a state or its citizens and a foreign country or foreign citizen. Note
that this does not include cases where both parties are citizens (i.e.,
residents) of the same state, and no federal question is raised. [11]
II. CONGRESS' CONTROL OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL POWER
A. Congress' power to decide:
Congress has the general power to decide what types of cases the Supreme Court
may hear, so long as it doesn't expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction beyond
the federal judicial power (as listed in the prior paragraph.) [Ex parte McCardle] [12 - 13]
B. Lower courts:
Congress also may decide what lower federal courts there should be, and what
cases they may hear. Again, the outer bound of this power is that Congress
can't allow the federal courts to hear a case that is not within the federal
judicial power. [13]
Example 1: Congress
may cut back the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts pretty much whenever
and however it wishes. Thus Congress could constitutionally eliminate
diversity jurisdiction (i.e., suits between citizens of different states),
even though such suits are clearly listed in the Constitution as being within
the federal judicial power.
Example 2: But
Congress could not give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over cases
between two citizens of the same state, where no federal issue is posed. The
handling of such a case by the federal courts would simply go beyond the
federal judicial power as recited in the Constitution.
I. TE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM
A. The federalist system: We have a
"federalist" system. In other words, the national government and the
state governments co-exist. Therefore, you always have to watch whether some
power being asserted by the federal government is in fact allowed under the
Constitution, and you must also watch whether some power asserted by the
states is limited in favor of federal power. [17]
B. Federal government has limited
powers: The most important principle in this whole area is that the federal
government is one of limited, enumerated powers. In other words, the three
federal branches (Congress, the executive branch, and the federal courts) can
only assert powers specifically granted to them by the United States
Constitution. So any time Congress passes a statute, or the President issues,
say, an Executive Order, or the federal courts decide a case, you've got to
ask: What is the enumerated, specified power in the U.S. Constitution that
gives the federal branch the right to do what it has just done? (This is very
different from what our Constitution says about the powers of state
governments: state governments can do whatever they want as far as the U.S.
Constitution is concerned, unless what they are doing is expressly forbidden
by the Constitution.) [17]
1. No general police power: The
most dramatic illustration of this state/federal difference is the general
"police power." Each state has a general police power, i.e., the
ability to regulate solely on the basis that the regulation would enhance
the welfare of the citizenry. But there is no general federal police power,
i.e., no right of the federal government to regulate for the health, safety
or general welfare of the citizenry. Instead, each act of federal
legislation or regulation must come within one of the very specific,
enumerated powers (e.g., the Commerce Clause, the power to tax and spend,
etc.).
a. Tax and spend for general
welfare: Congress does have the right to "lay and collect taxes...to
pay the debts and provide for the...general welfare of the United
States.... " (Article I, Section 8.) But the phrase
"provide for the...general welfare" in this sentence modifies
"lay and collect taxes...to pay the debts.... " In other words,
the power to tax and spend is subject to the requirement that the general
welfare be served; there is no independent federal power to provide for
the general welfare.
C. "Necessary and Proper"
Clause: In addition to the very specific powers given to Congress by the
Constitution, Congress is given the power to "make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the specific powers.
The "Necessary and
Proper" Clause means that if Congress is seeking an objective that is within the
specifically enumerated powers, then Congress can use any means that is: (1)
rationally related to the objective Congress is trying to achieve; and (2) is
not specifically forbidden by the Constitution. [19 - 21]
D. Can't vilate
specific constitutional provision: Even where Congressional action appears to
fall within a specific grant of power, the federal action may not, of course,
violate some other specific constitutional guarantee. In other words,
Congressional (or other federal) action must satisfy two tests to be
constitutional: (1) it must fall within some specific grant of power under the
Constitution; and (2) it must not violate any specific constitutional
provision. [18]
Chapter 4, 5 and 8
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
I. POWERS OF THE THREE FEDERAL BRANCHES
A. Powers of the three branches: Here
is a summary of the powers of the three branches of the federal government:
f. Enforcement of Civil War
amendments: Congress can enforce the post-Civil War amendments. (For
instance, under its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery,
Congress can ban even private intrastate non-commercial conduct.)
c. Treaty and foreign affairs:
The President can make treaties with foreign nations (but only if
two-thirds of the Senate approves). He appoints ambassadors. Also, he
effectively controls our foreign policy - some of this power over foreign
policy stems from his right to appoint ambassadors, but much is simply
implied from the nation's need to speak with a single voice in foreign
affairs (so that Congressional involvement in the details of foreign
affairs will generally not be appropriate).
d. Appointment of federal officers:
The President appoints all federal officers. These include cabinet members,
federal judges and ambassadors. (But the Senate must approve all such
federal officers by majority vote.) As to "inferior [federal]
officers," it's up to Congress to decide whether these should be
appointed by the President, by the judicial branch, or by the "heads of
departments" (i.e., cabinet members). (But Congress can't make these
lower-level appointments itself; it may merely decide who can make these
appointments.)
f. Veto: The President may veto
any law passed by both houses (though this veto may be overridden by a
2-3's majority of each house.) If the President doesn't veto the bill
within 10 days after receiving it, it becomes law (unless Congress has
adjourned by the 10th day after it sent him the bill - this is the
so-called "pocket veto").
II. THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
A. Summary: Probably Congress' most
important power is the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the
several states." (Art. I, ?8.) This is the
"Commerce power." [25]
Exam Tip: Any time
you have a test question in which Congress is doing something, first ask
yourself, "Can what Congress is doing be justified as an exercise of
the commerce power?" Most of the time the answer will be
"yes."
B. Summary of
modern view: There seem to be four broad categories of activities which
Congress can constitutionally regulate under the Commerce power:
1. Channels: First, Congress can
regulate the use of the "channels" of interstate commerce. Thus
Congress can regulate in a way that is reasonably related to highways,
waterways, and air traffic. Presumably Congress can do so even though the
activity in question in the particular case is completely intrastate. [40]
2. Instrumentalities: Second,
Congress can regulate the "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce, even though the particular activities being regulated are
completely intrastate. This category refers to people, machines, and other
"things" used in carrying out commerce. [40]
Example: The states and private
parties keep information about the identities of drivers. Since this
information gets exchanged across state lines (e.g., from states to
companies that want to sell cars), the information is an article in
interstate commerce and Congress may regulate how it's used. [Reno v. Condon]
4.
"Substantially affecting" commerce: Finally, the biggest (and
most interesting) category is that Congress may regulate those activities
having a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. [U.S. v. Lopez.] As to this category, the
following rules now seem to apply: [41]
a. Activity is commercial: If
the activity itself is arguably "commercial," then it doesn't
seem to matter whether the particular instance of the activity directly
affects interstate commerce, as long as the instance is part of a
general class of activities that, collectively, substantially affect
interstate commerce. So even purely intrastate activities can be
regulated if they're directly "commercial." [41]
Example: D owns a small farm in
Ohio. All the wheat he raises is eaten by him and his family. Congress
sets a quota on all wheat grown in the nation, and penalizes those who
grow more than their share of the quota. D asserts that as applied to
him, the quota is beyond Congress' power, because his own wheat has
nothing to do with interstate commerce.
Held, for the government. P's
own growth and consumption of wheat may be minuscule and completely
intrastate. But it's part of the broader category of wheat consumed by
its grower. This category has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, because the more wheat is consumed by the people who grow it,
the less is purchased and sold in interstate commerce. Therefore,
Congress acted within its Commerce power in regulating D's
conduct. [Wickard v. Filburn]
Example 1:
Congress makes it a federal crime to possess a firearm in or near a
school. The act applies even if the particular gun never moved in (or
affected) interstate commerce. Held, in enacting this statute Congres
went beyond its Commerce power. To fall within the
Commerce power, the activity being regulated must have a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce. The link between
gun-possession in a school and interstate commerce is too tenuous to
qualify as a "substantial effect," because if it did, there
would be essentially no limit to Congress' Commerce power. [U.S. v. Lopez]
Example 2:
Congress says that any woman who is the victim of a violent gender-based
crime may bring a civil suit against the perpetrator in federal court.
Held, Congress went beyond its Commerce power. Although it may be
true that some women's fear of gender-based violence dissuades them from
working or traveling interstate, gender-based violence is not itself a
commercial activity, and the connection between gender-based violence
and interstate commerce is too attenuated for the violence to have a
"substantial effect" on commerce. [U.S. v. Morrison]
i. Jurisdictional hook: But
where the congressional act applies only to particular activities each
of which has a direct link to interstate commerce, then the act will
probably be within the Commerce power. Thus the use of a
"jurisdictional hook" will probably suffice. (Example:
Suppose the statute in Lopez by its terms applied
only to in-school gun possession if the particular gun had previously
moved in interstate commerce. This would probably be enough of a
connection to interstate commerce to qualify.) [39]
c. Little deference to
Congress: The Court won't give much deference (as it used to) to the
fact that Congress believed that the activity has the requisite
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce. The Court will
basically decide this issue for itself, from scratch. It certainly will
no longer be enough that Congress had a "rational basis" for
believing that the requisite effect existed - the effect must in fact
exist to the Court's own independent satisfaction. [Lopez.] [41]
d. Traditional
domain of states: If what's being regulated is an activity the
regulation of which has traditionally been the domain of the states, and
as to which the states have expertise, the Court is less likely to find
that Congress is acting within its Commerce power. Thus education, family
law and general criminal law are areas where the court is likely to be
especially suspicious of congressional "interference." [41]
i. National solution:
However, the fact that the activity has traditionally fallen within
the states' domain can be outweighed by a showing that a national
solution is needed. This would be so, for instance, where one state's
choice heavily affects other states. Regulation of the environment is
an example, since air and water pollution migrate across state
boundaries.
C. The Tenth Amendment as a limit
on Congress' power: The Tenth Amendment provides that "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the People." This Amendment today seems to place a small but
possibly significant limit on Congress' ability to use its commerce power to
regulate the states. [44 - 49]
1. Generally-applicable law: If
Congress passes a generally applicable law, the fact that the regulation
affects the states has virtually no practical significance, and the Tenth Amendment never comes into play. If
the regulation would be valid if applied to a private party, it is also
valid as to the state. [46]
Example: Congress
passes minimum-wage and overtime provisions, which are made applicable to
all businesses of a certain size. The statute contains no exemption for
employees of state-owned mass transit systems. Held, the regulation even of state
employees here is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power, and is
not forbidden by the Tenth Amendment. [Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority]
Example: Congress
provides that each state must arrange for the disposal of toxic waste
generated within its borders, or else be deemed to "take title"
to the waste and thereby become liable for tort damages stemming from it.
Held, the congressional scheme violates the Tenth Amendment. Congress may not force a
state to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, and this is in
effect what Congress has tried to do here. New York v. United States, supra.
III. THE TAXING AND SPENDING POWERS
A. Taxing power: Congress has the
power to "lay and collect taxes." (Art. I, ?8.) This is an independent
source of congressional power, so it can be used to reach conduct that might
be beyond the other sources of congressional power, like the Commerce Clause. [55]
b. Customs duties and excise
taxes must be uniform: All customs duties and excise taxes must be
uniform throughout the United States. (Example: Congress may not place a
$.10 per-gallon federal excise tax on gasoline sales that take place in
New Jersey, and a $.15 per-gallon tax on those that take place in
Oklahoma.) [55]
B. Spending power: Congress also
has the power to "pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States." (Art. I, ?8.) This is the
"spending" power. [56]
1. Independent power: This is an
independent power, just like the Commerce power. So Congress could spend
to achieve a purely local benefit, even one that it couldn't achieve by
regulating under the Commerce power.
2. Use of
conditions: Congress may place conditions upon use of its spending power,
even if the congressional purpose is in effect to regulate. Conditions
placed upon the doling out of federal funds are usually justified under
the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause (which lets Congress use any means to seek an objective falling
within the specifically-enumerated powers, as long as the means is
rationally related to the objective, and is not specifically forbidden by
the Constitution). [57]
Example: Suppose
Congress makes available to the states certain funds that are to be used
for improving the states' highway systems. Congress provides, however,
that no state may receive any of these funds unless the state has by
statute imposed a speed limit of no higher than 55 mph on all state roads.
Even without reference to the Commerce Clause, this is a valid use of
congressional power. That's because by the combination of the spending power and the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause, Congress is permitted to impose conditions (even ones motivated
solely by regulatory objectives) on the use of federal funds.
C. "General Welfare"
Clause: Although, as noted above, Congress can "provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States," the reference to
"general welfare" does not confer any independent source of
congressional power. In other words, no statute is valid solely because
Congress is trying to bring about the "general welfare." Instead,
the phrase "for the general welfare" describes the circumstances
under which Congress may use its "taxing and
spending" power. So if Congress is regulating (rather than taxing and spending),
it must find a specific grant of power (like the Commerce Clause), and it's not enough that
the regulation will promote the general welfare. [58]
IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Separation of powers generally:
Let's now review some of the major practical consequences that come from the
fact that each federal branch gets its own set of powers. These practical
consequences are collectively referred to as "separation of
powers" problems. [107 - 113]
Example: During the Korean War,
Pres. Truman wants to avert a strike in the nation's steel mills. He
therefore issues an "executive order" directing the Secretary of
Commerce to seize the mills and operate them under federal direction. The
President does not ask Congress to approve the seizure. Held, the seizure
order is an unconstitutional exercise of the lawmaking authority reserved
to Congress. [Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer]
a. Line Item Veto: The
principle that the President can't make the laws means that the
President can't be given a "line item veto." That is, if
Congress tries to give the President the right to veto individual
portions of a statute (e.g., particular expenditures), this will violate
the Presentment Clause. (The Presentment
Clause says that bills are enacted into law by being passed by both
Houses, then being presented to the President and signed by him.) [Clinton v. City of New
York]
[109]
b. Congress'
acquiescence: But the scope of the President's powers may be at least
somewhat expanded by Congress' acquiescence to his exercise of the
power. This congressional acquiescence will never be dispositive, but in
a close case, the fact that Congress acquiesced in the President's
conduct may be enough to tip the balance, and to convince he Court that
the President is merely carrying out the laws rather than making them.
[108]
c. Implied
powers: Recall that Congress' powers are somewhat expanded by the "Necessary &
Proper" clause - Congress can pass any laws reasonably
related to the exercise of any enumerated power. There's no comparable
"Necessary & Proper" clause for the President. But the
effect is the same, because of the inherent vagueness of the phrase
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed..." The
Constitution does specifically enumerate some of the President's powers
(e.g., the pardon power, the commander-in-chief power, etc.) But this
specific list is not supposed to be exclusive. Instead of giving a
complete list of the President's powers (as is done for Congress), the
Constitution gives the President this general "executive" or
"law carrying out" power.
i. Consequence: Consequently,
so long as the President's act seems reasonably related to carrying
out the laws made by Congress, the Court won't strike that act merely
because it doesn't fall within any narrow, enumerated Presidential
power. (Example: Nothing in the Constitution expressly gives the
President prosecutorial discretion (the power to decide whom to
prosecute), yet he clearly has this power, because it's part of the
broader job of "carrying out the law".)
d. Delegation: Congress may
delegate some of its power to the President or the executive branch.
This is how federal agencies (which are usually part of the executive
branch) get the right to formulate regulations for interpreting and
enforcing congressional statutes. If Congress delegates excessively to
federal agencies (by not giving appropriate standards), the delegation
can be struck down - but this is very rare.
2. Declaring and waging war:
Another key separation of powers principle is that only Congress, not the
President, can declare war. The President can commit our armed forces to
repel a sudden attack, but he cannot fight a long-term engagement without
a congressional declaration of war. [115]
3. Treaties and executive
agreements: As noted, the President has the power to enter into a treaty
with foreign nations, but only if two-thirds of the Senate approves.
Additionally, the Court has held that the Constitution implicitly gives
the President, as an adjunct of his foreign affairs power, the right to
enter into an "executive agreement" with a foreign nation,
without first getting express Congressional consent. [59 - 60]
a. Gneral scheme: More
specifically, the scheme is that only the President, not Congress, may
appoint "principal," i.e., high-level federal officers.
Congress cannot appoint "inferior," i.e., lower-level federal
officials either, but it may say which of three other entities - the
President, the Courts, or the Cabinet - may appoint these lower
officials. [116 - 117]
Example: Congress establishes
the federal Election Commission, which enforces federal campaign laws.
The Commission has power to bring civil actions against violators. The
statute establishing the Commission allows Congress to appoint a
majority of the Commission's members. Held, the tasks performed by the
Commission are primarily executive, and its members are "officers
of the United States." Therefore, the members must be appointed by
the President, not Congress. [Buckley v. Valeo]
i. Removal by Congress:
Conversely, Congress may not remove an executive officer. This is true
whether the officer is a "principal" or "inferior"
one. [Bowsher v. Synar] However, Congress
can to some extent limit the power of the President to remove an
officer, if Congress specifies a term of office and then provides that
removal is allowable only for cause. (Example: Congress may say that
the Special Prosecutor - an executive officer - may only be removed by
the Executive Branch for "good cause" or other inability to
perform his duties. [Morrison v. Olson]) [119 - 121]
d. Impeachment: Congress can
remove any "officer" of the U.S. (President,Vice President,
Cabinet members, federal judges, etc.) by impeachment. The House must
vote by a majority to impeach (which is like an indictment). Then, the
Senate conducts the trial; a two-thirds vote of the Senators present is
required to convict. Conviction can be for treason, bribery, and other
"high crimes and misdemeanors." Probably only serious crimes,
and serious non-criminal abuses of power, fall within the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors." [121 - 122]
5. Removal of federal judges:
Federal judges cannot be removed by either Congress or the President. Article III provides that federal
judges shall hold their office during "good behavior." This has
been held to mean that so long as a judge does not act improperly, she may
not be removed from office. The only way to remove a sitting federal judge
is by formal impeachment proceedings, as noted above.
a. Non-Article III judges:
However, the above "life tenure" rule applies only to
garden-variety federal judges who hold their positions directly under Article III. Congress is always
free to establish what are essentially administrative judgeships, and as
to these, lifetime tenure is not constitutionally required.
1. Speech and Debate Clause:
Members of Congress are given a quite broad immunity by the "Speech and
Debate" Clause: "For any speech or debate in either house, [members of
Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place." This clause
shields members of Congress from: (1) civil or criminal suits relating to
their legislative actions; and (2) grand jury investigations relating to
those actions. [122]
b. Qualifed for
others: But all other federal officials, including presidential aides,
receive only qualified immunity for their official acts. (They lose this
immunity if they violate a "clearly established" right,
whether intentionally or negligently.) [Harlow v. Fitzgerald] [123]
a. Outweighed: Since the
privilege is qualified, it may be outweighed by other compelling
governmental interests. For instance, the need for the President's
evidence in a criminal trial will generally outweigh the President's
vague need to keep information confidential. [U.S. v. Nixon] [124 - 127]
Chapter 6
TWO LIMITS ON STATE POWER: THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Dormant Commerce Clause
generally: The mere existence of the federal commerce power restricts the
states from discriminating against, or unduly burdening, interstate
commerce. This restriction is called the "Dormant Commerce
Clause."[65]
d. Summary: So to summarize
this test, it's both a "mere rationality" test (in that the
regulation must be rationally related to fulfilling a legitimate state
end) plus a separate balancing test (in that the benefits to the state
from the regulation must outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce).
[69]
2. Discrimination against
out-of-staters: Above all else, be on the lookout for intentional
discrimination against out-of-staters. If the state is promoting its
residents' own economic interests, this will not be a legitimate state
objective, so the regulation will virtually automatically violate the Commerce Clause.
Example: New York
refuses to let a Massachusetts wholesaler set up a receiving station in
New York, from which he can buy New York milk to sell it to Massachusetts
residents. New York is worried that this will deprive New Yorkers of
enough milk. Held, this restriction violates the Dormant Commerce Clause -
New York is protecting its own citizens' economic interests at the expense
of out-of-staters, and this is an illegitimate objective. [H.P. Hood & Sons v.
DuMond]
3.
Health/safety/welfare regulations: Regulations that are truly addressed to
the state's health, safety and welfare objectives are usually
"legitimate." (But again, this cannot be used as a smokescreen
for protecting residents' own economic interests at the expense of
out-of-staters.)
4. Balancing
test: When you perform the
balancing part of the test (to see whether the benefits to the state from
its regulation outweigh the unintentional burdens to commerce), pay
special attention to whether there are less restrictive means available to
the state: if the state could accomplish its objective as well (or even
almost as well) while burdening commerce less, then it probably has to do
so. [70 - 71]
a. Lack of uniformity: A
measure that leads to a lack of uniformity is likely to constitute a big
burden on interstate commerce. For instance, if various states'
regulations are in conflict, the Court will probably strike the minority
regulation, on the grounds that it creates a lack of uniformity that
substantially burdens commerce without a sufficiently great
corresponding benefit to the state.
5. Some contexts: The most
standard illustrations of forbidden protectionism are where the state
says, "You can't bring your goods into our state," or "You
can't take goods out of our state into your state." Here are some
other contexts where Dormant Commerce Clause analysis may be important:
a. Embargo of natural
resources: Laws that prevent scarce natural resources from moving out of
the state where they are found are closely scrutinized. Often, this is
just protectionism (e.g., a state charges higher taxes on oil destined
for out-of-state than for in-state use.) But even if the state's
interest is conservation or ecology, the measure will probably be struck
down if less-discriminatory alternatives are available. [78]
b. Environmental regulations:
Similarly, the states may not protet their environment at the expense of
their neighbors, unless there is no less-discriminatory way to achieve
the same result. (Example: New Jersey prohibits the importing of most
solid or liquid waste into the state. Held, this violates the Commerce Clause. Even if the state's
purpose was to protect the state's environment or its inhabitants'
health and safety, the state may not accomplish these objectives by
discriminating against out-of-staters. [Philadelphia v. New
Jersey])
[79 - 81]
6. Discrimination by city against
out-of-towners: The dormant Commerce Clause also prevents a city or county
from protecting its own local economic interests by discriminating against
both out-of-state and out-of-town (but in-state) producers. (Example:
Michigan allows each county to decide that it will not allow solid wastes
generated outside the county to be disposed of in the county. County X
responds by barring both non-Michigan waste and waste generated in
Michigan by counties other than X. Held, this scheme violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause because it is an attempt to protect local interests
against non-local interests. The regulation is not saved merely because it
discriminates against in-state but out-of-county waste producers as well
as out-of-state producers. [Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill v. Mich. Dept. of Nat. Res.][75]
7. Market
participant exception: But there is one key exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause rules: if the state acts as a market participant, it may
favor local over out-of-state interests. (Example: South Dakota owns a
cement plant. It favors in-state customers during shortages. Held, this
does not violate the Commerce Clause, because the state is
acting as a market participant. [Reeves v. Stake]) [81 - 83]
B. State taxation of interstate
commerce: Just as state regulation may be found to unduly burden (or
discriminate against) interstate commerce, so state taxation may be found to
unduly burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, and thus violate
the Commerce Clause. To strike a state tax as
violative of the Commerce Clause, the challenger must generally show
either:[83 - 85]
2. Burdensome: Or, that the
state's taxing scheme (perhaps taken in conjunction with other states'
taxing schemes) unfairly burdens interstate commerce even though it
doesn't discriminate on its face. One way this can happen is if the tax
leads to unfair cumulative taxation. The test is whether, if every state
applied the same tax, commerce would be unduly burdened.
Example: North Dakota requires
every out-of-state mail order vendor who sends mail into the state to
collect N.D. use tax on any sales made to N.D. buyers, even if the vendor
has no in-state employees. Held, this taxing scheme violates the Commerce Clause, because it unduly
burdens interstate commerce. If this scheme were allowable, all 6,000
taxing jurisdictions in the U.S. could impose local-tax-collection
requirements on all out-of-state vendors, making compliance virtually
impossible. [Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota][85]
II. CONGRESSIONAL PRE-EMPTION AND
CONSENT; THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
A. Congressional pre-emption and
consent: The discussion above relates only to the "Dormant"
Commerce Clause, i.e., the situation in which Congress has not attempted to
exercise its commerce power in a particular area. Now, we consider what
happens when Congress does take action in a particular area of commerce.
[85]
B. Pre-emption: Congress can
preempt the states from affecting commerce. There are two ways it can do
this:
a. Joint compliance impossible:
First, it may be impossible to obey both the state and federal
regulations simultaneously. (Example: Suppose the state requires a
certain type of labeling on cereal boxes, and the FDA regulations (done
pursuant to Congress' authorization) require a different type of
labeling. Since the box can't practically contain both types of
labeling, the state's labeling requirement is invalid under the Supremacy Clause.) [86]
b. Conflicting
objectives: Second, the objective behind the two sets of regulations may
be inconsistent. Here, too, the state regulation must fall even though
the regulated party could theoretically comply with both sets
simultaneously. [86]
2. Federal occupation of field:
Congress may also pre-empt state regulation not because there is an actual
conflict between what Congress does and what the states do, but because
Congress is found to have made the decision to occupy the entire field.
This is always a question of congressional intent. [86 - 87]
C. Consent by Congress: Conversely,
Congress may consent to state action that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. Congress may even allow a
state to discriminate against out-of-staters. [87 - 89]
D. The Supremacy
Clause: Article VI, Clause 2, states that "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof...shall be the supreme Law of the Land...." This is
the "Supremacy Clause." The rules governing
preemption in Commerce-Clause cases (discussed above) derive from the Supremacy Clause. [85]
Example: Congress
passes a statute stating that no person shall be required to retire
earlier than the age of 65. State X passes a law stating that any
university located in State X may require its tenured professors to retire
at the age of 60. Assuming that the federal law is a
constitutionally-valid exercise of congressional powers (which certainly
seems to be the case), the law of State X is invalid under the Supremacy Clause - in the case of a
conflict between a federal statute and a state law, the state law must
give way.
2. Federal silence: Cases in
which there is a direct conflict between a federal law and a state law (as
in the above example) are fairly easy to spot as violations of the Supremacy Clause. But the Supremacy Clause
may also be violated if the state legislates or regulates in an area that
has been "preempted" by federal regulation. In other words, if
Congress has manifested an intent to occupy an entire field, then any
state regulation in that field - even if it does not directly conflict
with federal regulation - will be found to be invalid because of the
Supremacy Clause. Our discussion just above of pre-emption in commerce
cases is one illustration of this general Congressional power to pre-empt
state regulation by occupying a whole field.
Chapter 7
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES; INTERSTATE RELATIONS
I. TAX AND REGULATORY IMMUNITIES
A. Several types of immunities:
There are several kinds of immunities produced by our federalist system:
[95]
Example: Suppose a private
contractor doing work for the federal government under a cost-plus
contract is required to pay a state tax. The fact that the burden of
this tax will be passed on to the federal government under the contract
won't be enough to trigger the immunity. This is so because on these
facts, the "legal incidence" of the tax is not on the U.S.
a. Federal contractors: State
regulation of a federal contractor (one performing a contract on behalf
of the federal government) may also violate the federal immunity from
state regulation. However, as in the state taxation context, the states
have greater leeway to regulate federal contractors than to regulate the
federal government directly. In general, a state may regulate federal
contractors as long as the regulation does not interfere with federal
purposes or policies. For instance, a state regulation that has the
effect of increasing the cost borne by the federal government under the
contract might be invalid as a violation of this immunity.
4. State immunity from federal
regulation: The converse immunity, immunity of the states from federal
regulation, exists only in a very theoretical way. In general, federal
regulation of the states is valid. However, if a federal regulatory scheme
hadthe effect of preventing the states from exercising their core
functions, this might be found to be a violation of the Tenth Amendment. [97]
II. THE INTERSTATE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
A. Interstate Privileges and
Immunities: Article IV of the Constitution says
that "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." This is the
"interstate" Privileges and Immunities Clause. (Be sure you
distinguish this from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents a state
from denying certain rights of "national citizenship" (like the
right to travel).) [98]
a. What rights are fundamental:
The rights that are "fundamental in the national unity" are
all related to commerce. Thus the right to be employed, the right to
practice one's profession, and the right to engage in business are all
fundamental, and are therefore protected by the interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
Example: Alaska
requires that Alaskan residents be given an absolute preference over
non-residents for all jobs on the Alaska oil pipeline. Held, since
access to employment is a right fundamental to national unity, Alaska's
decision to prefer its own citizens over out-of-staters impairs the
out-of-staters' rights under the interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and is invalid. [Hicklin v. Orbeck, the "Alaska Hire" case] [98]
b. Substantial relation to
state objective: Second, the state must show that its solution (the
discriminatory statute) is "substantially related" to this
"peculiar evil" the out-of-staters represent. Generally, to
meet this prong the state must show that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives that would adequately address the problem.
(For instance, in Alaska Hire, had Alaska been able
to show that there was no other way to combat unemployment than to
absolutely prefer in-staters, it would have met this prong.) [99]
3. No "market
participant" exception: Recall that a state is immune from Commerce Clause violations if it's acting
as a market participant. But there's no such market participant exception
for the Privileges &
Immunities Clause. (Thus even if, in the Alaska Hire case, Alaska had been
hiring the workers itself, its absolute preference for residents would
have violated the clause.) [100 - 101]
b. Strict
scrutiny: Conversely, the level of scrutiny given to the state's action
is much tougher under Privileges &
Immunities Clause than under Equal Protection Clause. Under Equal
Protection, non-residency isn't a suspect classification, and therefore
the discrimination must just meet a standard of "mere
rationality." Under the Privileges & Immunities Clause, by
contrast, the statute must survive what amounts to strict scrutiny - the
non-residents must be a "peculiar source of the evil," and
there must not be less-discriminatory alternatives available. [101]
Chapter 9
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two major principles: For the
rest of this outline, we'll be talking about rights guaranteed to
individuals by the Constitution. Before we get into the individual rights,
there are two general principles that are crucial to remember: [134 - 135]
1. Protected against the
government: First, practically all of the individual rights conferred by
the Constitution upon individuals protect only against government action.
They do not protect a person against acts by other private individuals.
(Example: Suppose P is a woman who's two months pregnant, and none of the
private hospitals in her state will perform an abortion. P's substantive
due process right to an abortion has not been violated, because the
government has not interfered with that right.)
2. Not directly
applicable to states: The other general principle to remember is the
central role of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Many of the important individual guarantees are given by the
Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments). For instance, the First Amendment rights of free expression
and freedom of religion fall into this category. But the Bill of Rights
does not directly apply to the states. However, the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause (which does apply to the states) has been interpreted
to make nearly all of the Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the
states - these individual guarantees are "incorporated" into the
Bill of Rights. "Incorporation" is discussed further below.
II. THE 14TH AMENDMENT GENERALLY
A. Text of 14th Amendment: Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment
provides, in full, that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction hereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [135]
B. The Bill of Rights and the
states: One of the major functions of the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause is
to make the Bill of Rights - that is, the first 10 amendments - applicable
to the states. [134]
2. Effect of due process clause:
But enactment of the 14th Amendment in 1868 effectively
changed this. The 14th Amendment directly imposes on the states (and local
governments as well) the requirement that they not deprive anyone of
"life, liberty or property" without due process. Nearly all the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as being so important that if a state denies these rights, it has in
effect taken away an aspect of "liberty."
3. Application of
Bill of Rights to states: The Supreme Court has never said that due
process requires the states to honor the Bill of Rights as a whole.
Instead, the Court uses an approach called "selective
incorporation". Under this approach, each right in the Bill of Rights
is examined to see whether it is of "fundamental" importance. If
so, that right is "selectivey incorporated" into the meaning of
"due process" under the 14th Amendment, and is thus made binding
on the states. [135 - 138]
4. Nearly all
rights incorporated: By now, nearly all rights contained in the Bill of
Rights have been incorporated, one by one, into the meaning of "due
process" (and thus made applicable to the states). [137] The only
major Bill of Rights guarantees not incorporated are:
5. "Jot-for-jot"
incorporation: Once a given Bill of Rights guarantee is made applicable to
the states, the scope of that guarantee is interpreted the same way for
the states as for the federal government. The Court has rejected "the
notion that the 14th Amendment applies to the states
only a 'watered-down'...version of the individual guarantees of the Bill
of Rights." [Malloy v. Hogan] [137 - 138]
C. The federal Due Process Clause:
We'll generally be discussing the 14th Amendment's due process
clause,
which binds the states. But keep in mind that there is also a due process
clause in the 5th Amendment, that is binding on the
federal government. Both clauses have been interpreted the same way, so that
any state action that would be forbidden by the 14th Amendment Due Process
Clause is also forbidden to the federal government via th 5th Amendment Due
Process Clause. (For instance, exactly the same limits apply to federal and
state regulations that impair the right to have an abortion.)[138]
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS -
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE REGULATION
A. Substantive due process
generally: There are two quite different functions that the Due Process Clause serves. Most obviously, it
imposes certain procedural requirements on governments when they impair
life, liberty, or property. (We'll be talking about this "procedural
due process" area below.) But the Due Process Clause also limits the
substantive power of the states to regulate certain areas of human life.
This "substantive" component of the Due Process Clause derives
mainly from the interpretation of the term "liberty" - certain
types of state limits on human conduct have been held to so unreasonably
interfere with important human rights that they amount to an unreasonable
(and unconstitutional) denial of "liberty". [138]
Exam Tip: Any time
your fact pattern suggests that a state or federal government is taking away
some thing or value that could be considered "life,"
"liberty," or "property," then entirely apart from the
issue of whether the government has used proper procedures, you must ask the
question: Has the government by carrying out this taking violated the
individual's substantive interest in life, liberty, or property?
1. Non-fundamental rights:
There's an absolutely critical distinction that you must make right at the
outset, when you're analyzing a substantive due process problem. That's
the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental rights. If a right
or value is found to be "non-fundamental," then the state action
that impairs that right only has to meet the easy "mere
rationality" test. In other words, it just has to be the case that
the state is pursuing a legitimate governmental objective, and is doing so
with a means that is rationally related to that objective.
a. Economic regulation: Nearly
all economic regulation (and most "social welfare" regulation)
will turn out to implicate only non-fundamental rights, and will almost
certainly be upheld under this easy-to-satisfy mere rationality
standard. So anytime you can't find a fundamental right being impaired,
you should presume that the measure does not violate substantive due
process.
2. Fundamental rights: But if a
state or federal government is impairing a "fundamental" right,
then it's a different ball game entirely: here, the court uses strict
scrutiny. Only if the governmental action is "necessary" to
achieve a "compelling" governmental objective, will the
government avoid violating substantive due process.
3. Significance of distinction:
So 95% of the battle in analyzing a substantive due process problem is
deciding whether the right in question is "fundamental" or not.
Once you know that, you pretty much know how the case will come out - if
the right is not "fundamental," there's almost certainly no
substantive due process problem; if the right is fundamental, then strict
scrutiny will almost certainly result in the measure being invalidated. S
as you prepare for your exam, it's worth devoting some significant mental
effort to remembering which rights are fundamental.
B. Economic and social-welfare
regulation: It is very easy for state economic regulation to survive
substantive due process attacks. Since 1937, the Court has not struck down
an economic regulation for violating substantive due process. [145]
b. Minimally rationally
related: Second, there must be a "minimally rational relation"
between the means chosen by the legislature and the state objective. To
put it another way, the Court will presume that the statute is
constitutional unless the legislature has acted in a completely
"arbitrary and irrational" way.
2. Other (non-economic)
non-fundamental rights: Outside the economic area, the same rule applies
as long as no fundamental right is being affected: the state must merely
be pursuing a legitimate state objective by rational means. So most
"social welfare" legislation merely has to meet this very easy
standard. We discuss below what rights are "fundamental" - in
summary, these rights relate to sex, marriage, child-bearing and
child-rearing, all components of the general "right to privacy."
(By contrast, practically no economic rights are "fundamental" -
the sole exception may be the right to practice a profession or calling,
and even this is not certain.)
a. General rule: For now, the
important thing to remember is that if the right does not fall within
this grouping of "fundamental" rights, the state must merely
act rationally in pursuit of some health, safety or other "general
welfare" goal. [145]
Example: New York sets up a
prescription drug reporting scheme, whereby the names and addresses of
all patients who receive prescriptions for certain drugs must be
reported by doctors, and are placed on a central computer. Some
individuals claim that this regulation infringes on their right to avoid
government collection of private matters. Held, the statute does
infringe on a patient's right to keep prescription information secret.
But this right is not "fundamental." Therefore, the statute
will be sustained as long as the state is acting in pursuit of a
legitimate state objective, and has chosen a rational means. Here, these
requirements are satisfied. [Whalen v. Roe].
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS -
REGULATIONS AFFECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. Fundamental rights generally:
The rest of our discussion of substantive due process will be solely about
fundamental rights. [146]
1. Strict scrutiny: If a state or
federal regulation is impairing a fundamental right, the court strictly
scrutinizes the regulation. Here is what it means in practical terms for
the Court to apply strict scrutiny to a state or federal regulation that
impairs a fundamental right: (1) the objective being pursued by the state
must be "compelling" (not just "legitimate" as for a
non-fundamental right); and (2) the means chosen by the state must be
"necessary" to achieve that compelling end. In other words,
there must not be any less restrictive means that would do the job just as
well (if there were, then the means actually chosen wouldn't be
"necessary"). [146]
a. Burden of proof: When strict
scrutiny is used, there is an important impact on who bears the burden
of persuasion. In the usual case in which strict scrutiny is not being
used, the person attacking the statute has the burden of showing that
the state is pursuing an illegitimate objective, or that the state has
chosen a means that is not rationally related to its objective. But if
strict scrutiny is used because a "fundamental" right is
involved, the burden of proof shifts: now, it's up to the state to show
that it's pursuing a compelling objective, and that the means it chose
are "necessary" to achieve that objective.
2. Rights governed: The only
rights that have been recognized as "fundamental" for
substantive due process purposes are ones related to the loose category
"right to privacy." Sometimes this area is said to involve the
"right to autonomy" - what we're really talking about is usually
a person's right to make his own decisions about highly personal matters.
This right of privacy or autonomy derives indirectly from several Bill of
Rights guarantees, which collectively create a "penumbra" or
"zone" of privacy. [147]
a. List: The list of rights or
interests falling within this "right to privacy" or
"right to autonomy" include actually just a few related areas:
marriage, child-bearing, and child-rearing. So anytime you're looking at
a particularly narrow interest and you have to decide whether it's
"fundamental," first ask yourself, "Does it fall within
the areas of marriage, child-bearing, or child-rearing?" If not,
it's probably not "fundamental."
i. Illustrations: So the
right to use birth control, to live together with your family, to
direct the upbringing and education of your children, to marry - these
are some (probably most) of the specific interests that are
"fundamental."
ii. Non-illustrations: By
contrast, an interest that does not fall within one of these areas
probably is not fundamental - for instance, an adult's interest in
having consensual sex outside of marriage seems not to be
"fundamental." (The right to abortion used to be
"fundamental," but now seems to be only
"quasi-fundamental" after Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.)
B. Birth control: Individuals'
interest in using birth ontrol is "fundamental." So whether a
person is married or single, he or she has a fundamental interest in
contraception, and the state cannot impair that interest without satisfying
strict scrutiny. (Example: Planned Parenthood cannot be prohibited from
supplying condoms or diaphragms to single or married adults who want them. [Griswold v. Connecticut]) [148 - 151]
1. The right today: In this post-Casey world, here is what seems
to be the status of abortion: A woman has a constitutionally-protected
privacy interest in choosing to have an abortion before viability.
However, the state has a somewhat countervailing interest in protecting
"potential life," even before viability. This conflict seems to
yield the following results:
b. Regulation: However, the
state has a far greater ability to regulate the abortion process than it
did before Casey. The state may regulate
only if it does not place an "undue burden" on the woman's
right to choose a pre-viability abortion. A regulation will constitute
an "undue burden" if the regulation "has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman"
seeking a pre-viability abortion. [163]
c. Not a
fundamental right that will be strictly scrutinized: Apparently,
abortion is no longer a fundamental right, and restrictions on it are no
longer to be strictly scrutinized. This represents a huge departure from
the law as it stood under Roe v. Wade.
Example 1 (informed consent): The
state may impose an elaborate "informed consent" provision,
whereby at least 24 hours before performing an abortion, the physician
must inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of
both abortion and childbirth, the probable gestational age of the fetus,
the availability of state-printed materials, etc. Casey. [158]
a. Spousal consent: The state
may not give a pregnant woman's spouse a veto right over the woman's
abortion decision. [Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth]
In fact, the state may not even require that the woman notify her spouse
of her intent to get an abortion, even if the state exempts cases of
spousal sexual assault or threatened bodily injury. [Casey] [164]
b. Parental
consent: The state may require that an unemancipated woman under the age
of 18 obtain parental consent. The state may also require that this
parental consent be "informed," even if this requires an
in-person visit by the parent to the facility, and even if it involves a
24-hour waiting period. [164]
ii. Emancipation or maturity:
The state must also allow an individualize judicial hearing at which
the girl may persuade the court that she is in fact sufficiently
mature or emancipated that she is able to make this decision for
herself. If the girl proves this, the abortion must be allowed even if
the judge believes that the abortion is not in the girl's best
interest.
4. Public funding: States may
refuse to give public funding (e.g., Medicaid) for abortions even though
they give such funding for other types of operations. Also, states may
prohibit public hospitals from performing abortions. [165 - 167]
5. Abortion counseling: The
government may, as a condition of funding family-planning clinics, insist
that the doctor or other professional not recommend abortion, and not
refer clinic patients to an abortion provider. [Rust v. Sullivan] [166 - 167]
6. Types of
abortion: The state probably has substantial freedom to place regulations
on the types of abortions that may be performed. For instance, the state
may probably now require that all second trimester abortions be performed
in a hospital (even though a pre-Casey decision, Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, says that the states may not do this). [167]
D. Family relations: Whenever the
state interferes with a person's decision about how to live his family life
and raise his children, you should be on the lookout to see whether a
fundamental right is being interfered with. [172 - 175]
Example: A city may not enact a
zoning ordinance that prevents first cousins from living together, because
the right of members of a family - even a non-nuclear family - to live
together is "fundamental," and any state interference with that
right will be strictly scrutinized. [Moore v. East Cleveland]
Note: What the
Court was protecting in Moore was clearly the right of
families to live together, not the more general right to live with
whomever one wants outside of ties of blood and marriage. Thus the Court
had previously held [Belle Terre v. Boraas] that unrelated people
had no "fundamental right" to live together, and in Moore the
Court pointed out that families' rights to live together were different,
and much stronger.
Example 2: A
parent has a fundamental interest in deciding who will spend time with the
child. Therefore, the state may not award visitation rights to a child's
grandparents over the objection of the child's fit custodial parent,
unless the state first gives "special weight" to the parent's
wishes. [Troxel v. Granville]
a. Right to continue parenting:
There's also probably a fundamental right to continue parenting - so the
state can't take away your child just because it thinks a foster home
would be "better" for the child. (Even if there's child abuse,
the parent still has a fundamental right to parent, but here the state's
interest in protecting the child would be "compelling," so
putting the child in foster care would probably satisfy strict
scrutiny.)
b. No relationship: If a parent
has never married the other parent, and has never developed a
relationship with the child (e.g., they have never lived together), then
there is probably not a fundamental right to continue to be a parent.
(So the state may, for instance, deny the non-custodial unwed parent who
has never participated in the child's upbringing the right to block an
adoption of the child. [Quilloin v. Walcott] [175]
E. Adult sex: There seems to be no
general fundamental right to engage in adult consensual sexual activity.
[176]
1. Homosexual sodomy: So, for
instance, adults have no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,
and the state may therefore not only ban but criminally punish such
activity. [Bowers v. Hardwick] [176 - 178] (But this
may be about to change; see Romer v. Evans, an Equal Protection case in which the Court
struck down an enactment that said homosexuals could not be protected from
anti-gay discrimination. [178])
2. Other sexual
conduct: In fact, outside of the marriage relationship, there is probably
no kind of sexual activity the practice of which is a "fundamental
right". Thus the state can almost certainly prohibit, and punish,
adultery and fornication. [178]
3. Married
people's conduct: But where the parties are married, there probably is a
fundamental right to have even "deviant" sex, as long as it's
not physically dangerous and is consensual. For instance, the state
probably may not prohibit oral sex in marriage, since that would fall
within the marriage area of the right to privacy. [179]
F. The "right to die,"
and the right to decline unwanted medical procedures: The law of "right
to die" and "right to pull the plug" is developing. Here's
what we know already:
1. Can't be forced to undergo
unwanted procedures: A competent adult has a 14th Amendment liberty interest in not
being forced to undergo unwanted medical procedures, including artificial
life-sustaining measures. It's not clear whether this is a
"fundamental" interest. (Example: P, dying of stomach cancer,
has a liberty interest in refusing to let the hospital feed him through a
feeding tube.) [180]
3. "Clear
and convincing evidence" standard: In the case of a now-incompetent
patient, the state's interest in preserving life enitles it to say that it
won't allow the "plug" to be "pulled" unless there is
"clear and convincing evidence" that the patient would have
voluntarily declined the life-sustaining measures. [Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dept. of Health] [181]
Example: P is
comatose, hospitalized, being fed through a tube, and kept breathing
through a respirator. P's parents want the hospital to discontinue the
tube-feeding and respirator. Held, the state may insist that if the
parents can't show "clear and convincing evidence" that during
her conscious life P showed a desire not to be kept alive by such
artificial measures, the measures must be continued. [Cruzan, supra]
a. Living wills and health-care
proxies: But probably the states must honor a "living will"
and a "health-care proxy." In a living will, the signer gives
direct instructions. In a health-care proxy, the signer appoints someone
else to make health care decisions. [182]
G. Other possible places: Here are
a couple of other areas where there might be a fundamental right.
2. Physical
appearance: You may have a fundamental right to control your personal
appearance. (Example: If the public school which you are required to
attend forces you to cut your hair to a length of no more two inches for
boys and four inches for girls, this might violate a "fundamental
right." But this is not clear.) [179 - 180]
H. Final word: Deciding whether the
right in question is "fundamental" is, as noted, the key to
substantive due process analysis. But it's not the end of the story. Even if
you decide that the right is "fundamental" you've still got to
carry out the strict scrutiny analysis: it might turn out thatthe state's
countervailing interest is indeed "compelling" and the means
chosen is "necessary" to achieve that interest. (Example: A state
has a compelling interest in taking a child away from an abusive parent and
putting him into foster care.)
1. Non-fundamental: Conversely,
even if the right is not "fundamental," you've still got to
apply the "mere rationality" standard, and you might decide that
the state is being so completely irrational that the state action is a
violation of substantive due process anyway.
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Introduction: We turn now to the
other main aspect of the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause:
this is the requirement that the state act with adequate or fair procedures
when it deprives a person of life, liberty or property. Here, the emphasis
is on the particular case presented by the particular person - has the
government handled his particular situation fairly? Our discussion is
divided into two main questions: (1) has the individual's life, liberty or
property been "taken"?; and, if so, (2) what process was
"due" him prior to this taking?
1. Life, liberty or property: The
most important single thing to remember about procedural due process is
that there cannot be a procedural due process problem unless government is
taking a person's life, liberty or property. In other words, there is no
general interest in having the government behave with fair procedures.
(Example: A city hires for an opening on its police force. The city can be
as arbitrary and random as it wants, because as we'll see, an applicant
for a job has no liberty or property interest in obtaining the job.
Therefore, the city doesn't have to give the applicant a hearing, a
statement of reasons why she didn't get the job, a systematic test of her
credentials, or any other aspect of procedural fairness.) [196]
Example: Suppose a state passes a
law that says that no person with child support may marry. This statute
raises an issue of substantive due process - unless this means of
enforcing child support payments is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, the state may not use that method at all, against anyone.
Separately, even if this "ban on marriage" could pass this
substantive due process hurdle (which it apparently can't, based on past
Supreme Court cases like Zablocki v. Redhail) the state still must use
adequate procedures before enforcing the ban against a particular person.
For instance, the state must probably provide a person with notice that the ban will be applied, and a
hearing at which he can show that the ban shouldn't apply to him because
(for instance) he's fully paid up. The obligation to use fair procedures
always applies "one case at a time," and governs the appliation
of government action to a particular person in a particular situation.
B. Liberty: Remember that
"liberty" is one of the things the government cannot take without
procedural due process. What is "liberty" for due process
purposes? [197]
1. Physical liberty: First, we
have the interest in "physical" liberty. This liberty interest
is violated if you are imprisoned, or even if you are placed in some other
situation where you do not have physical freedom of movement (e.g.,
juvenile and/or civil commitment).
2. Intangible rights: Also, a
person has a liberty interest in being able to do certain intangible
things not related to physical freedom of movement. There's no complete
catalog of what interests fall within this "intangible" aspect
of liberty. Here are some examples, however: (1) the right to drive; (2)
the right to practice one's profession; (3) the right to raise one's
family. But one's interest in having a good reputation is not
"liberty" (so the state can call you a crook without giving you
due process - see Paul v. Davis.) [200]
C. Property: The government also
can't take "property" without procedural due process. Here are the
things that may be "property" for procedural due process purposes:
[197]
1. Conventional property: First,
of course, we have "conventional" property (i.e., personal and
real property). Thus the government cannot impose a monetary fine against
a person, or declare a person's car forfeited, without complying with
procedural due process.
a. Debt collection: Certain
kinds of debt collection devices involve "property." For
instance, if the state lets private creditors attach a person's bank
account prior to trial (which means that the owner can't get at the
funds), even that temporary blockage is a "taking" of
property. Similarly, if the state lets a private creditor garnish a
person's wages, that's a taking of property. On the other hand, if the
state simply passes a law that lets creditors use self-help to repossess
goods, there's no governmental taking of property when the creditor
repossesses. (The due process requirement applies only where it is
government that does, or at least is involved in, the taking of liberty
or property).
2. Government benefits:
Government benefits may or may not constitute "property" rights.
Generally, if one is just applying for benefits and hasn't yet been
receiving them, one does not have a property interest in those benefits.
(Example: If P applies for welfare, and has never gotten it before, the
government does not have to comply with procedural due process when it
turns P down. Therefore, the government doesn't have to give P a statement
of reasons, a hearing, etc.)
a. Already getting benefits:
But if a person has already been getting the benefits, it's probably the
case that he's got a property interest in continuing to get them, so
that the government cannot terminate those benefits without giving him
procedural due process. [Goldberg v. Kelly] [198] (But state law
can change even this - for instance, if the state statute governing
welfare benefits says that "benefits may be cut off at any
time," you probably don't have a property interest in continuing to
get those benefits, so you have no claim to due process.)
i. Ordinarily at-will:
Ordinarily, under state law a job is terminable at will; if so, the
jobholder has no property right to it, so he may be fired without due
process. [199]
ii. Legitimate claim of
entitlement: If either a statute or the public employer's practices
give a person a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to keep
the job, then she's got a property interest. (Example: If a public
university follows the publicized custom of never firing anybody from
a non-tenured position without cause except on one year's notice, then
a non-tenured teacher has a property right to hold his non-tenured job
for a year following notice. [Perry v. Sindermann]) [200]
D. Process required: If a person's
interest in property or liberty is being impaired, then she is entitled to
due process. But what procedures does the person get? There is no simple
answer. [201]
a. Court proceedings: Where a
person is a litigant in a formal judicial proceeding, a quite full panoply
of procedural safeguards is constitutionally required for "due
process." The state is required to give the litigant the right to a
hearing, the right to call witnesses, the right to counsel, the right to a
fair and objective trial, and the right to an appeal. (Other
constitutional provisions aside from the Due Process Clause give additional
procedural safeguards. For example, the Sixth Amendment confers a right to jury
trial in criminal cases, the right to appointed counsel if one is
indigent, and a right to confront witnesses against oneself.) [201]
b. Non-judicial
proceeding: Where the property or liberty interet is being impaired in
something other than a judicial proceeding, the state does not have to
give the individual the full range of procedural safeguards that would be
needed for a court proceeding. Instead, for any particular procedural
safeguard that the plaintiff says she should get (e.g., the right to a
hearing), the court conducts a balancing test. The strength of the
plaintiff's interest in receiving the procedural safeguard is weighed
against the government's interest in avoiding extra burdens. [201 - 203]
Examples: If A
has been receiving welfare benefits, these benefits may not be terminated
without giving A an evidentiary hearing, because a wrongful termination of
welfare benefits, even temporarily, is likely to lead to extreme hardship,
without a large countervailing benefit to the government. [Goldberg v. Kelly] By contrast, a tenured
employee who is being fired from a government job gets fewer procedural
safeguards - he gets notice of the charges and an opportunity to present
some evidence, but not a full adversarial evidentiary hearing with right
to counsel; this is because the government's interest in being able to
fire unsatisfactory employees quickly is factored into the balance. [Cleveland Board of Ed. v.
Loudermill]
Chapter 10
EQUAL PROTECTION
I. EQUAL PROTECTION GENERALLY
A. Text of clause: The Equal
Protection Clause is part of the 14th Amendment. It provides that
"[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall...deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [215]
1. General usage: The Clause,
like all parts of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, was enacted shortly
after the Civil War, and its primary goal was to attain free and equal
treatment for ex-slaves. But it has always been interpreted as imposing a
general restraint on the governmental use of classifications, not just
classifications based on race but also those based on sex, alienage,
illegitimacy, wealth, or any other characteristic.
2. State and
federal: The direct text of the Clause, of course, applies only to state
governments. But the fedral government is also bound by the same rules of
equal protection - this happens by the indirect means of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. So if a given action would be a violation of Equal Protection for a state, that same
action would be unconstitutional if done by the federal government (though
in this situation, if you wanted to be scrupulously correct, you would
call it a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause). [217]
Example: D, a large private
university, refuses to admit African American students. No government
participates in this decision. The university's conduct cannot be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, because there is no
"state action."
3. Making of classes: The Equal Protection Clause is only implicated where
the government makes a classification. It's not implicated where the
government merely decides which of two classes a particular person falls
into. (For instance, if Congress says that you don't receive Social
Security if you work more than 1,000 hours per year, then it's made a
classification that distinguishes between those who work more than 1,000
hours and those who work less - this classification can be attacked under
the Equal Protection Clause. But an administrative determination that a
particular person did or did not work 1,000 hours is not a classification,
and cannot be attacked under the Equal Protection Clause, only the Due Process Clause.) [217]
4. "As
applied" vs. "facial": Here is some nomenclature: If P
attacks a classification that is clearly written into the statute or
regulation, he is claiming that Equal Protection is violated by the
statute or regulation "on its face." If P's claim is that the
statute does not make a classification on its face, but is being
administered in a purposefully discriminatory way, then he is claiming
that the statute or regulation is a violation of equal protection "as
applied." (Example: A statute that says "you must be a citizen
to vote" creates a classification scheme "on its face" -
citizens vs. non-citizens. But if P claims that in actual administration,
blacks are required to prove citizenship but whites are not, then his
equal protection claim would be on the statute "as applied.")
a. Same standards for both:
Either kind of attack - facial or "as applied," - may be made.
Both follow essentially the same principles. For instance, if no suspect
classification or fundamental right is involved, the classification
scheme will violate the Equal Protection Clause if it's not rationally
related to a legitimate state objective, whether the scheme is on the
face of the statute or merely in the way the statute is applied.
Example: Consider
racial segregation in the public schools. Such segregation gives a
different treatment to two groups that are similarly situated, African
Americans and whites. Therefore, it violates the Equal Protection rights of African
Americans. (Of course, this reflects a judgment that there are no
meaningful differences between blacks and whites that relate to public
education. If the issue were, say, compulsory medical screening for sickle
cell anemia, blacks and whites might not be similarly situated).
a. Dissimilar: The Equal Protection Clause also guarantees that
people who are not similarly situated will not be treated similarly. But
this aspect is rarely of practical importance, because courts are rarely
convinced that differences in situation require differences in treatment
by the government.
6. Three levels of review: Recall
that in our discussion of substantive due process, we saw that depending
on the circumstances, one of two sharply different standards of review of
governmental action was used, the easy "rational relation" test
or the very demanding "strict scrutiny" standard. I the Equal Protection context, we have two
tests that are virtually the same as these two, plus a third "middle
level" of scrutiny. Let's consider each of the three types of review:
[221]
a. Ordinary "mere
rationality" review: The easiest-to-satisfy standard of review
applies to statutes that: (1) are not based on a "suspect
classification"; (2) do not involve a "quasi-suspect"
category that the Court has implicitly recognized (principally gender
and illegitimacy); and (3) don't impair a "fundamental right."
This is the so-called "mere rationality" standard. Almost
every economic regulation will be reviewed under this easy-to-satisfy
standard. (This is similar to the ease with which economic regulation
passes muster under the substantive due process
clause).
Under this easiest "mere rationality" standard, the Court asks
only "whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a
rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by
the Constitution." [221]
i. Standard summarized: So
where "mere rationality" review is applied, the
classification must satisfy two easy tests: (1) government must be
pursuing a legitimate governmental objective; and (2) there must be a
rational relation between the classification and that objective.
Furthermore, it's not necessary that the court believe that these two
requirements are satisfied; it's enough that the court concludes that
it's "conceivable" that they're satisfied.
b. Strict scrutiny: At the
other end of the spectrum, the Court will give "strict
scrutiny" to any statute which is based on a "suspect
classification" or which impairs a "fundamental right."
(We'll be discussing below the meaning of these two terms, "suspect
classification" and "fundamental right"). A
classification based on race is a classic example of a "suspect
class"; the right to vote is an example of a fundamental right.
[222]
i. Standard: Where strict
scrutiny is invoked, the classification will be upheld only if it is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Thus not only
must the objective be an extremely important one, but the
"fit" between the means and the end must be extremely tight.
This strict scrutiny test is the same as for substantive due process
when a "fundamental right" (e.g., the right to privacy) is
involved.
c. Middle-level review: In a
few contexts, the Court uses a middle level of scrutiny, more probing
than "mere rationality" but less demanding than "strict
scrutiny". This middle level is mainly used for cases involving
classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. [222]
i. Standard: This
middle-level test is usually stated as follows: the means chose by the
legislature (i.e., the classification) must be substantially related
to an important governmental objective. So the legislative objective
must be "important" (but not necessarily
"compelling," as for strict scrutiny), and means and end
must be "substantially related" (easier to satisfy than the
almost perfect "necessary" fit between means and end in
strict scrutiny situations).
7. Importance: Con Law essay
exams very frequently test the Equal Protection Clause because: (1) it's
open-ended, so it applies to a lot of different situations; (2) there are
often no clear right or wrong answers under it, so it gives the student a
good chance to show how well she can articulate arguments on either side;
and (3) it's one of the two or three most important single limitations on
what government can do to individuals.
II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LAWS - THE
"MERE RATIONALITY" TEST
A. Non-suspect, non-fundamental
rights (economic and social legislation): First, let's examine the treatment
of classifications that do not involve either a suspect class or a
fundamental right. Most economic and social-welfare legislation falls into
this category. [222]
1. Mere rationality: Here, as
noted, courts use the "mere rationality" standard. In other
words, as long as there is some rational relation between the
classification drawn by the legislature and some legitimate legislative
objective, the classification scheme will not violate the Equal Protection Clause. [222]
Example: Suppose
the Muni City Council, in order to cope with a budget deficit, increases
the fares on all city-operated buses from $1 to $2. Statistical evidence
shows that 80% of people who ride the Muni bus system on a typical day
have incomes below the city-wide median. At the same time the City Council
increases the bus fares, it refuses to raise the annual automobile
inspection fee; car owners on average have higher-than-median incomes. P,
a bus passenger, sues Muni, arguing that it is a violation of his equal protection rights for the city to
increase bus fares for the poor while not increasing inspection fees for
the affluent.
A court would
apply the "mere rationality" standard to this regulation,
because poverty is not a suspect class, and no fundamental right is at
issue here. Since the City Council could rationally have believed that
Muni's deficit would be better handled by raising bus fares, and because
the ouncil could rationally have decided to tackle its deficit problem one
phase at a time, the constitutional challenge will almost certainly lose.
2. Conclusion: Therefore, if you
decide that a particular government classification does not involve a
suspect category or a fundamental right, and should thus be subjected to
"mere rationality" review, you should almost always conclude
that the classification survives equal protection attack.
Example: Suppose that a state
requires all state troopers over 50 to retire, in order preserve a
physically fit police force. Because age is not a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, the "mere rationality" test will
be used. Because there is some slight overall relation between age and
fitness, this requirement is satisfied, so the retirement rule does not
violate equal protection. [Mass. Board of
Retirement v. Murgia]
Example:
Suppose that a state provides that no low-income housing project may be
built in any community unless a majority of the voters approve it in a
popular referendum. A resident who would like to live in the low-income
housing that would be built if allowed challenges the statute on equal protection grounds. Even if P
shows that the statute was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
the poor, P's constitutional challenge will probably fail. Because
wealth is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the court will use
"mere rationality" review, and will uphold the statute if it
finds that the legislature could reasonably have believed that its
statute might help achieve some legitimate state objective, perhaps
letting communities avoid the greater governmental cost that arguably
accompanies concentrations of low-income residents.
Example: A city
makes it harder for group homes for the mentally retarded to achieve
zoning permission than for other group living arrangements to do so.
This classification, based upon mental status, will not be treated as
suspect or quasi-suspect, and will thus be subject only to "mere
rationality" review. (However, such a zoning procedure was found to
violate even "mere rationality," in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center.)
Example: Colorado amends its
constitution to prohibit any state or local law that protects
homosexuals against discrimination on the basis of their sexual
orientation or conduct. Held, this amendment violates gays' equal protection rights - it's not
even minimally rational, and is motivated solely by animus towards
gays. [Romer v. Evans]
III. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS,
ESPECIALLY RACE
A. Suspect classifications: At the
other end of the spectrum, we apply strict scrutiny for any classification
that involves a "suspect class." [234]
1. Race and national origin:
There are only three suspect classes generally recognized by the Supreme
Court: (1) race; (2) national origin; and (3) for some purposes, alienage.
So be on the lookout for a classification basd on race, national origin,
or alienage. For other classifications, you can safely assume that these
are not suspect. [234]
2. Purposeful: One of the most
important things to remember about strict scrutiny of suspect
classifications is that this strict scrutiny will only be applied where
the differential treatment of the class is intentional on the part of the
government. If the government enacts a statute or regulation that merely
has the unintended incidental effect of burdening, say, African Americans
worse than whites, the court will not use strict scrutiny. [Washington v. Davis] This is probably the
most frequently-tested aspect of suspect classifications. [235 - 240]
Example: Suppose
a city gives a standardized test to all applicants for the local police
force. The city and the test designers do not intend to make it harder for
African Americans than for whites to pass the test. But it turns out that
a lot fewer African Americans pass than whites, even though the applicant
pools otherwise seem identical. This differential will not trigger strict
scrutiny, because the government did not intend to treat African Americans
differently from whites.
a. Circumstantial evidence:
However, remember that an intent to classify based on a suspect class
can be proven by circumstantial, not just direct, evidence. For
instance, if a particular police force picks new officers based on a
personal interview conducted by the police chief, and over five years it
turns out that only 1% of African American applicants receive jobs but
25% of whites do (and there is no apparent objective difference in the
black versus white applicant pools), this statistical disparity could
furnish circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination, which
would then allow a court to apply strict scrutiny to the selection
procedures.
3. Invidious: In addition to the
requirement that the discrimination be "purposeful," it must
also be "invidious," i.e., based on prejudice or tending to
denigrate the disfavored class. This requirement is what has caused race,
national origin, and (for some purposes) alienage to be the only suspect
classes - these involve the only minorities against whom popular prejudice
is sufficiently deep. [240]
a. Rationale: Why do we give
especially close scrutiny to governmental action that disadvantages very
unpopular minorities? Because ordinarily, groups will protect themselves
through use of the political process, but: (1) these particular groups
don't usually have very much political power, because the past
discrimination against them has included keeping them out of the voting
system; and (2) even if the minority votes in proportion to its numbers,
the majority is very likely to vote as a block against it, because of
the minority's extreme unpopularity.
b. "Discrete and
insular" minority: A famous phrase to express this concept, from a
footnote in a Supreme Court opinion, is "discrete and insular
minorities" - discrete and insular minorities are ones that are so
disfavored and out of the politcal mainstream that the courts must make
extra efforts to protect them, because the political system won't. [240]
i. Immutability: If the class
is based on an immutable or unchangeable trait, this makes a finding
of suspectness more likely. Race and national origin qualify; wealth
does not. The idea seems to be that if you can't change the trait,
it's especially unfair to have it be the basis of discrimination.
[240]
ii. Stereotypes: If the class
or trait is one as to which there's a prevalence of false and
disparaging stereotypes, this makes a finding of suspectness more
likely. Again, race, national origin and alienage seem to qualify, at
least somewhat better than, say, wealth. [241]
iii. Political powerlessness:
If the class is politically powerless, or has been subjected to
widespread discrimination (especially official discrimination)
historically, this makes it more likely to be suspect.
d. "Separate but
equal" as invidious: Even if a classification involves a group that
has frequently been discriminated against, the classification's
defenders may argue that their particular use of the classification is
not "invidious" because it's not intended to disadvantage the
class. Affirmative action is one example where this argument might be
raised. Another context in which the requirement that the discrimination
be "invidious" arises is the "separate but equal"
situation; in this context, the defenders of the classification claim
that although both classes are treated differently, the unpopular class
is being treated no "worse." In general, the Court now seems
to hold that discrimination based on race or national origin is
"per se" invidious; for instance, the argument that the races
are being treated "separately but equally" will almost never
serve as a successful defense to an Equal Protection problem. [243]
Example:
Virginia forbids interracial marriage. It claims that blacks aren't
disfavored, because whites are blocked from marrying blacks just as much
as blacks are blocked from marrying whites. Held, the statute's
legislative history shows that it was enacted to protect the
"racial purity" of whites, so the classification is invidious
and violates Equal Protection. [Loving v. Virginia]
4. Strict equals fatal: Once the
court does decide that a suspect classification is involved, and that
strict scrutiny must be used, that scrutiny is almost always fatal to the
classification scheme. For instance, no purposeful racial or ethnic
classification has survived strict scrutiny since 1944. [242]
a. "Necessary" prong:
Sometimes, this is because the state cannot show that it is pursuing a
"compelling" objective. But more often, it's because the means
chosen is not shown to be "necessary" to achieve that
compelling objective. A means is only "necessary" for
achieving the particular objective if there are no less discriminatory
alternatives that will accomplish the goal as well, or almost as well.
Example: Suppose Pearl Harbor
occurred today, and the U.S. government once again put any citizen of
Japanese ancestry into an internment camp. Presumably this would not be
a "necessary" means of dealing with the danger of treason and
sabotage, because less discriminatory alternatives like frequent
document inspections and/or loyalty oaths would be almost as effective
as virtual imprisonment.
a. Child custody and adoption:
Some notion of "racial compatibility" or "racial
purity" may motivate state officials to differentiate based on race
in child custody and adoption proceedings. In general, the practical
rule is that the state may not impose flat rules that handle child
custody and adoption differently based solely on the race of the child
and parents. [245]
Example: Mother and Father are
divorced, and Mother is given custody of Child. All are white. Mother
then marries Husband, who is African American. The family court
transfers custody to Father, on the grounds that Child will be socially
stigmatized if she grows up in an interracial family. Held, this custody
decision can't survive strict scrutiny - government may not bow to
private racial prejudices. [Palmore v. Sidoti]
Example: A state requires that
in every election, each candidate's race must appear on the ballot.
Held, this violates Equal Protection because it was
motivated by a desire to keep African Americans out of office. [Anderson v. Martin]
a. General rule: Official,
intentional segregation based on race or national origin is a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. As the result of Brown v. Board of
Education, even if the government were to maintain truly "separate
but equal" facilities (in the sense that, say, a school for blacks
had as nice a building, as qualified teachers, etc., as a school for
whites), the intentional maintenance of separate facilities per se
violates the Equal Protection Clause. [245 - 250]
i. Education: Thus if a
school board establishes attendance zones for the purpose of making
one school heavily African American and/or Hispanic, and another
school heavily white, this would violate Equal Protection.
ii. Housing:
Similarly, government may not intentionally segregate in housing. For
example, it's a violation of Equal Protection for a city to do its
zoning in such a way that all government-subsidized housing is built
in the heavily black part of town, if the intent of this zoning
practice is to maintain racial segregation.
c. Must be de jure: But it's
critical to remember that there is a violation of equal protection only where the
segregation is the result of intentional goernment action. In other
words, the segregation must be "de jure," not merely "de
facto." [250]
Example: School
district lines are drawn by officials who have no desire to separate
students based on race. Over time, due to housing choices made by
private individuals, one district becomes fully African American, and
the other all-white. Even though the schools are no longer racially
balanced, there has been no equal protection violation, because
there was no act of intentional separation on the part of the
government. Cf. Bd. of Ed. v. Dowell. [251]
d. Wide
remedies: If a court finds that there has been intentional segregation,
it has a wide range of remedies to choose from. For instance, it can bus
students to a non-neighborhood school, or order the redrawing of
district boundaries. But whatever remedy the court chooses, the remedy
must stop once the effects of the original intentional discrimination
have been eradicated. (Then, if because of housing patterns or other
non-government action, the schools become resegregated, the court may
not reinstitute its remedies.)
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Race-conscious affirmative
action: You're more likely to get an exam question about race-conscious
affirmative action than about official discrimination against racial
minorities. If you see a question in which government is trying to help
racial or ethnic minorities by giving them some sort of preference, you
should immediately think "equal protection" and you should think
"strict scrutiny." [257]
1. Public entity: Be sure to
remember that there can only be a violation of equal protection if there's state action,
that is, action by the federal government or by a state or municipality.
In general, the use of affirmative action by private entities does not
raise any constitutional issue (except perhaps where a judge orders a
private employer to implement a race-conscious plan). But any time you
have a fact pattern in which a police department, school district, public
university, or other governmental entity seems to be intentionally
preferring one racial group over another, that's when you know you have a
potential equal protection problem.
2. Strict
scrutiny: It is now the case that any affirmative action program that
classifies on the basis of race will be strictly scrutinized. [Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.] So a
race-conscious affirmative action plan, whether it's in the area of
employment, college admissions, voting rights or anywhere else, must be
adopted for the purpose of furthering some "compelling"
governmental interest, and the racial classification must be
"necessary" to achieve that compelling governmental interest.
[261]
a. Past discrimination: Since a
race-conscious affirmative action plan will have to be in pursuit of a
"compelling" governmental interest, probably the only interest
that could ever qualify is the government's interest in redressing past
discrimination. So if the government is merely trying to get a balanced
work force, to get racial diversity in a university, to make African
Americans more economically successful, or any other objective that is
not closely tied to undoing clear past discrimination, you should
immediately be able to say, "The government interest is not
compelling, and the measure flunks the strict scrutiny test." [261
- 262]
c. Quotas: One device that is
especially vulnerable to Equal Protection attack is the
racially-based quota. A racially-based quota is an inflexible number of
admissions slots, dollar amounts, or other "goodies" set aside
for minorities. For instance, it's a quota if the state says that 1/2 of
all new hires in the police department must be African American, or if
it says that 20% of all seats in the public university's law school
class will be set aside for African Americans and Hispanics. Probably
virtually all racially-based quotas will be struck down even where the
government is trying to eradicate the effects of past discrimination -
the Court will probably say that a quota is not "necessary" to
remedy discrimination, because more flexible "goals" can do
the job. [262]
d. Congress: It
doesn't make any (or at least much) difference that the affirmation
action program was enacted by Congress rather than by a state or local
government. Here, too, the Court will apply strict scrutiny if the
program is race-conscious. [Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena.]
i. Possibly greater
deference: However, the Court might give slightly greater deference to
a congressional finding that official discriminaton had existed in a
particular domain, or that a particular race-conscious remedy was
required, than it would to a comparable finding by a state or local
government. (We don't know yet whether this greater deference would
occur.)
1. Preferential admissions: Any
scheme which gives a preference to one racial group for admission to a
public university has to be strictly scrutinized. Certainly a scheme that
reserves a fixed number of slots in a school for minorities would be a
quota, and would almost certainly be unconstitutional. [Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke].
Even if there is no quota, however, and race is simply considered as one
factor among many, the scheme might well be ruled unconstitutional. [264 -
268]
a. Socioeconomically deprived:
But a school could give special preference for "socioeconomically
deprived" applicants, even if it turned out that a disproportionate
number of these applicants were African American, so long as the intent
was not to prefer blacks.
2. Minority set-asides: Minority
set-asides, by which some percentage of publicly-funded contracts are
reserved for minority-owned businesses, will be subjected to scrutiny and
generally struck down. That's true whether the set-aside is enacted by
Congress or by a state/local government. [272 - 281]
b. Hiring: A
racial preference in hiring
is almost as hard to justify (though it might pass muster if that
particular public employer had clearly discriminated against African
Americans in the past, and there seemed to be no way short of a racial
preference in hiring to redress that past discrimination).
c. Promotions: A race-based
scheme of awarding promotions to cure past discrimination (so that
African Americans eventually get promoted to the levels that they would
have been at had there not been any discrimination in the first place)
is the easiest to justify, since it damages the expectations of whites
the least. But even this will have to satisfy strict scrutiny. [284]
/UL>
a. Loss at election not
sufficient: The mere fact that the plaintiff group (e.g., whites) does
not get the same percentage of seats as it has of the total group can
never by itself satisfy the "discriminatory effect" part of
test (1) above. The Ps must show that they lack political power, and
have been fenced out of the political process, over many elections.
(Example: Suppose a group of white voters claim that district lines
have been drawn to increase the chance that an African American will
be elected in a particular district. Even if the Ps can show this, and
show that a black was in fact elected, without more the Ps will lose -
only if the Ps can show that they have been consistently denied fair
participation in the electoral process, over the course of multiple
elections (something white voters can rarely show) can the Ps win.)
b. Race as predominant
factor: But if the court concludes that race was the predominate
factor in how the electoral district lines were drawn, the court will
strictly scrutinize the lines, and probably strike them down.
Legislatures may "take account" of race in drawing district
lines (just as they take account of ethnic groups, precinct lines, and
many other factors), but they may not make race the predominant
factor, unless they can show that using race in this way is necessary
to achieve a compelling governmental interest (e.g., eradication of
prior official voting-rights discrimination). The desire to create the
maximum number of "majority black" districts will not by
itself be a "compelling" interest. [Miller v. Johnson] [287]
V. MIDDLE-LEVEL REVIEW (GENDER,
ILLEGITIMACY AND ALIENAGE)
A. Middle-level review generally:
A few types of classifications are subjected to "middle-level"
review, easier to satisfy than strict scrutiny but tougher than "mere
rationality." [291]
a. No hypothetical objective:
One important respect in which mid-level review differs from
"mere rationality" review concerns the state objectives that
the Court will consider. Recall that in the case of the easy
"mere rationality" review, the Court will consider virtually
any objective that might have conceivably motivatd the legislature,
regardless of whether there's any evidence that that objective was in
fact in the legislature's mind. But with
"intermediate-level" review, the Court will not hypothesize
objectives; it will consider only those objectives that are shown to
have actually motivated the legislature.
2. What classes: There are two
main types of classifications that get middle-level review: (1) gender;
and (2) illegitimacy. We also consider alienage here, because it has
aspects of both strict scrutiny and mere rationality, so it's kind of a
hybrid.
B. Gender: The most important
single rule to remember in the entire area of middle-level scrutiny is
that sex-based classifications get middle-level review. [Craig v. Boren] So if government
intentionally classifies on the basis of sex, it's got to show that it's
pursuing an important objective, and that the sex-based classification
scheme is substantially related to that objective. [292 - 293]
Example: City
sets the mandatory retirement age for male public school teachers at 65,
and for female teachers at 62. Because this classification is based upon
gender, it must satisfy middle-level review: City must show that its
sex-based classification is substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective. In this case, it is unlikely that City
can make this showing.
2. Male or female plaintiff:
This means that where government classifies based on sex, the scheme can
be attacked either by a male or by a female, and either gender will get
the benefit of mid-level review.
Example: Oklahoma forbids the
sale of low-alcohol beer to males under the age of 21, and to females
under the age of 18. Held, this statute violates the equal protection rights of males aged 18
to 20, because it is not substantially related to the achievement of
important governmental objectives. [Craig v. Boren] [292 - 293]
3. Purpose:
Sex-based classifications will only be subjected to middle-level review
if the legislature has intentionally discriminated against one sex in
favor of the other. (This is similar to the requirement for strict
scrutiny in race-based cases.) If, as the result of some governmental
act, one sex happens to suffer an unintended burden greater than the
other sex suffers, that's not enough for mid-level review.
Example:
Massachusetts gies an absolute preference to veterans for civil service
jobs. It happens that 98% of veterans are male. Held, this preference
does not have to satisfy mid-level review because the unfavorable impact
on women was not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the preference
does not violate equal protection, since it satisfies the
easier "mere rationality" standard. [Personnel Admin. of
Mass. v. Feeney]
4. Stereotypes:
Be on the lookout for stereotypes: if the legislature has made a
sex-based classification that seems to reinforce stereotypes about the
"proper place" of women, it probably cannot survive
middle-level review. (Example: Virginia maintains Virginia Military
Institute as an all-male college, because of the state's view that only
men can handle the school's harsh, militaristic method of producing
"citizen soldiers." Held, this sex-based scheme does not
satisfy mid-level review, because it stems from traditional ways of
thinking about gender roles; there are clearly some women who are
qualified for and would benefit from the VMI approach, and these women
may not be deprived of the opportunity to attend VMI. [U.S. v. Virginia]) [294 - 297]
5.
"Exceedingly persuasive justification": Although the Supreme
Court still gives gender-based classifications only mid-level, not
strict, scrutiny, the Court now applies that scrutiny in a very tough
way. The Court now says that it will require an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for any gender-based classification, and
will review it with "skeptical scrutiny." [U.S. v. Virginia, supra.] [291]
C. Illegitimacy: Classifications
disadvantaging illegitimate children are "semi-suspect" and
therefore get middle-level review. [312]
1. Claims can't be flatly
barred: Therefore, the state can't simply bar unacknowledged
illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death actions, from having
any chance to inherit, etc. Such children must be given at least some
reasonable opportunity to obtain a judicial declaration of paternity
(e.g., in a suit brought by their mother). Once they obtain such a
declaration, they must be treated equivalently to children born
legitimate.
Example: Pennsylvania passes a
statute of limitations saying that no action for child support may be
brought on behalf of an out-of-wedlock child unless the action is
brought before the child turns 6. Held, the statute violates the child's
equal protection rights. Since the
classification is based on out-of-wedlock status, it will be upheld only
if it is substantially related to an important governmental objective.
Concededly, Pennsylvania has an interest in avoiding the litigation of
stale or fraudulent claims. But the 6-year statute of limitations is not
"substantially related" to the achievement of that interest. [Clark v. Jeter]
D. Alienage: Alienage might be
thought of as a "semi-suspect" category. In fact, though,
alienage classifications, depending on the circumstances, will be
subjected either to strict scrutiny or to mere rationality review (so
there's only middle-level review as a kind of "average").
1. Distinguished from national
origin: Be careful to distinguish "alienage" from
"national origin": if a person is discriminated against
because he is not yet a United States citizen, that's
"alienage" discrimination. If, on the other hand, he's
discriminated against because he is a naturalized citizen who originally
came from Mexico (or whose ancestors came from Mexico), that's
discrimination based on "national origin." Remember that
national origin always triggers strict scrutiny, whereas alienage does
not necessarily do so.
3.
"Representative government" exception: But the major exception
is that strict scrutiny does not apply where the discrimination against
aliens relates to a "function at the heart of representative
government." Basically, this means that if the alien is applying
for a government job, and the performance of this job is closely tied in
with politics, justice or public policy, we use only "mere
rationality" review. So government may discriminate against aliens
with respect to posts like state trooper, public school teacher, or
probation officer. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick. [308]
a. Low-level government jobs:
But don't make the mistake of thinking that because what's involved is
a government job, strict srutiny automatically fails to apply. If the
job is not closely tied in with politics, justice or public policy -
something that is true of most low-level jobs - then strict scrutiny
applies.
4. Education of illegal aliens:
A last quirky rule in the area of alienage is that if a state denies
free public education to illegal aliens, this will be subjected to
intermediate-level review, and probably struck down. [Plyler v. Doe] (But this comes from a
combination of the fact that the plaintiffs were aliens and also that
they were children. If a state discriminates against adult illegal
aliens, we don't know whether something higher than middle-level review
will be applied.) [309 - 312]
E. Other unpopular groups:
Discrimination against other unpopular groups might conceivably be
subjected to middle-level review. For instance, discrimination against the
elderly or the disabled might possibly trigger mid-level review, but the
Court has not addressed this question. (This would be a good gray area for
an exam question - you could argue both the pros and the cons of applying
mid-level review to these unpopular, frequently-discriminated-against
groups.)
1. Homosexuals: Similarly, gays
may eventually get the benefit of what is effectively mid-level review.
In fact, Romer v. Evans, which struck down an
anti-gay Colorado enactment, purports to apply mere-rationality review
but seems more like mid-level review. [229]
F. Congressional affirmative
action plans: Finally, remember that there's one other area where the
Court uses mid-level review: affirmative action programs established by
Congress.
VI. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. Fundamental rights generally:
Now, let's look at the second way strict scrutiny can be triggered in equal protection cases: there will be
strict scrutiny not only when a "suspect classification" is
used, but also when a "fundamental right" is burdened by the
classification the government has selected. Whenever a classification
burdens a "fundamental right" or "fundamental
interest," the classification will be subjected to strict scrutiny
even though the people who are burdened are not members of a suspect
class. [318]
1. "Fundamental"
defined: "Fundamental" means something absolutely different in
this Equal Protection context han it means in
the Substantive Due Process context. Remember that in due process, the
fundamental rights are ones related to privacy. Here, the fundamental
rights are related to a variety of other interests protected by the
Constitution, but generally having nothing to do with privacy. [319]
B. Voting rights: The right to
vote in state and local elections is "fundamental," so any
classification that burdens that right to vote will be strictly
scrutinized. [323]
Example 2: A
requirement that the voter own property or otherwise have some
"special interest" in order to vote will normally burden the
fundamental right to vote and thus be struck down. [Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist.] (The one exception is special-purpose districts like water
districts, which may restrict the vote to landowners. [Ball v. James])
Example 3: The
requirement that a voter have resided within the state for more than a
certain time prior to election day burdens the right to vote and will be
strictly scrutinized. [Dunn v. Blumstein].
1. Limiting of voter's choices:
If the state regulation of voting merely has the effect of
"burdening" the right to vote, instead of preventing the voter
from voting at all, the Court does not strictly scrutinize the
regulation. Instead, the Court balances the degree of the burden against
the magnitude of the state's interest. This is true, for instance, of
regulations that limit the voter's choices. [327]
C. Ballot access: The right to e
a political candidate, and to have your name on the ballot, seems to be
"quasi-fundamental." [327]
a. Unfair to new parties:
Restrictions that are unfair to new, not-yet-established political
parties. (Example: A rule saying that a minor party can get its
candidate on the ballot only if it presents signatures from 15% of the
voters, holds a formal primary, and has an elaborate party structure,
violates Equal Protection. [Williams v. Rhodes].) [329]
b. Based on
wealth: Ballot access limits that are based on wealth. (Example: A
$700 candidate filing fee, which the state refuses to waive for an
indigent candidate, violates Equal Protection. [Lubin v. Panish])
2. Candidate eligibility rules:
But reasonable rules concerning the eligibility of the individual
candidate, that don't fall into either of these two categories - unfair
to new parties, or based on wealth - seem to be generally upheld by the
Court. Thus a state may set a minimum age, or may require that the
candidate have resided for a certain period of time in the state or
district where he is seeking office.
D. Court access: Access to the
courts is sometimes a "fundamental right," so that if the right
is burdened by a state-imposed classification, that classification will
sometimes be closely scrutinized. Basically, what it comes down to is that
if the state imposes a fee that the rich can pay but the poor cannot, and
the access relates to a criminal case, strict scrutiny will be used.
(Example: The state cannot charge an indigent for his trial transcript in
a criminal case. [Griffin v. Illinois] Similarly, the state
must provide him with free counsel on appeal.) [330 - 332]
1. Civil litigation: When civil
litigation is involved, access to the courts is usually not fundamental.
Only for various family-law proceedings (e.g., divorce, paternity suits,
termination of parental rights) is the state barred from charging fees.
[Boddie v. Connecticut] [332 - 333]
E. Right to travel: The so-called
"right to travel" is generally a "fundamental" right.
This term "right to travel" is misleading - it's really the
right to change one's state of residence or employment. So any time the
state imposes a classification that burdens one's right to change her
state of residence or employment, that classification will be strictly
scrutinized. [333 - 336]
1. Duration of residence: This
mainly means that if the state imposes a substantial waiting period on
newly-arrived residents, before they can receive some vital governmental
benefit, this will be strictly scrutinized.
Example: Pennsylvania denies
welfare benefits to any resident who has not resided in the state for at
least a year. Held, this one-year waiting period impairs the
"fundamental right of interstate movement" so it must be
strictly scrutinized, and in fact invalidated. [Shapiro v. Thompson]. [334 - 335]
2. Vital
government benefit: But the key phrase here is "vital government
benefit" - if the benefit is not vital, then the state may impose a
substantial waiting period. (Example: A one-year waiting period before a
student can qualify for low in-state tuition at the public university
probably does not burden a fundamental right, and thus does not need to
be strictly scrutinized.)
F. Necessities: The right to
"necessities" is not fundamental. So if the state distributes
necessities in a way that treats different people differently (or if it
distributes the money to be used to buy these things differentially),
there will be no strict scrutiny because there is no fundamental right.
[337]
1. Education: For instance, one
does not have a fundamental right to a public school education.
Therefore, the state may allow or even foster inequalities in the
distribution of that public school education, without violating any
fundamental right, and thus without having to pass strict scrutiny. [San Antonio School Dist.
v. Rodriguez] [319 - 322]
Held, education
is not a fundamental right. Therefore, Texas' scheme merely has to
undergo "rational relation" review. Because the use of
property taxes to finance education is a rational way of achieving the
legitimate state goal of giving each local school district a large
measure of control over the education its residents get, tis "mere
rationality" standard is satisfied. San Antonio School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, supra.
a. Complete deprivation:
Actually, it's still possible that a complete deprivation of public
education might be held to be a violation of a "fundamental"
right. If a state simply refused to give any public education at all
to some groups of residents, this might be such a large deprivation
that it would amount to a violation of a fundamental right, and thus
be subject to strict scrutiny. [320]
2. Food, shelter: There is no
fundamental right to the material "necessities of life." Thus
food, shelter, and medical care are not "fundamental" for equal protection purposes. Therefore,
the state may distribute these things unevenly. Similarly, the state may
give some people but not others money for these things without having to
survive strict scrutiny. (Example:
The state can give a smaller per capita welfare payment to big families
than small families, without having the scheme subjected to strict
scrutiny. This is because the food and shelter for which the payments
are used are not "fundamental rights." [Dandridge v. Williams]) [337]
Chapter 11
MISCELLANEOUS CLAUSES
I. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES
A. Privileges and Immunities
Clause Generally: The Fourteenth Amendment has its own
"Privileges and Immunities" Clause: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." [349]
2. Right to
change state of residence: The clause is most relevant where a state
treats newly-arrived residents less favorably than those who have
resided in-state for a longer time: this violates the "right to
travel," protected by the clause. (Example: If a state gives
newly-arrived residents lower welfare payments than ones who have been
residents longer, this is a violation of the "right to travel"
protected by the 14th Amendment P&I
clause.
[Saenz v. Roe]) [350]
II. THE "TAKING" CLAUSE
A. The "Taking" Clause
Generally: The Fifth Amendment contains the
"Taking" Clause: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
1. General meaning: The gist of
the Taking Clause is that the government
may take private property under its "power of eminent domain,"
but if it does take private property, it must pay a fair price. This is
true even if the property is taken to serve a compelling governmental
interest. [351]
2. Taking vs.
regulation: The government (whether it's federal or state) must pay for
any property that it "takes." On the other hand, if it merely
"regulates" property under its police power, then it does not
need to pay (even if the owner's use of his property, or its value, is
substantially diminished). [352 - 359]
a. Land use regulations:
Usually the problem of distinguishing between a compensable
"taking" and a non-compensable "regulation" occurs
in the context of land-use regulation. For a land use regulation to
avoid being a taking, it must satisfy two requirements: (1) it must
"substantially advance legitimate state interests"; and (2)
it must not "deny an owner economically viable use of his
land."
ii. No denial of
economically vible use: The second requirement for a regulation is
that it must not "deny an owner economically viable use of his
land." Few land use regulations are likely to be found to deny
the owner all economically viable use of his land. For instance, if
a particular 3-story building is made a landmark, the fact that the
owner can't tear down the building to build a skyscraper doesn't
deprive him of "all economically viable use". But if the
state were to deny the owner the right to build any dwelling on the
land, this would probably constitute a denial of all economically
viable use. [353]
Example: A county forbids
the construction or use of any dwelling within an "interim
flood protection area." The Ps own property in such an area.
Held, this is such a complete denial of economically viable use that
the regulation amounts to a taking, and Ps may recover damages. [First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County]
Note: Most
zoning, environmental laws and landmark-preservation laws will
satisfy these two requirements, and will thus not be takings, merely
non-compensable regulations.
b. Permanent physical
occupation: If the government makes or authorizes a permanent physical
occupation of the property, this will automatically be found to
constitute a taking, no matter how minor the interference with the
owner's use and no matter how important the countervailing
governmental interests. (Example: The state requires landlords to
permit cable TV companies to install their cable facilities in the
landlord's buildings. Held, this compulsory cabling was a taking
because it was a permanent physical occupation, even though it didn't
really restrict the owner's use of his property or reduce its value. [Loretto v.
Teleprompter]) [353]
d. Landmark:
Landmark preservation schemes, just like zoning and environmental
regulations, will rarely be found to constitute a taking. This is
especially true where the designation of a particular building to
landmark status occurs as part of a comprehensive city-wide
preservation scheme. (Example: New York City didn't carry out a taking
when it designated Grand Central Station as a landmark; this was true
even though this designation prevented the owner from constructing a
55-story office building above the Terminal. [Penn Central v. New
York City]) [356]
e.
"Rough proportionality" for give-backs: When a city
conditions the owner's right to develop his property on some
"give back" by the owner, there must be a "rough
proportionality" between the burdens on the public that the
development would bring about, and the benefits to the public from the
give back. (Example: Owner wants to expand her store. City says,
"You may do that, but only if you deed to the public a 15-foot
strip of land to be used as a bike pathway." Held, this trade-off
was an unconstitutional taking of Owner's property, because City
didn't show that the public burdens from the extra traffic to Owner's
bigger store were "roughly proportional" to the public
benefits from the bike path. [Dolan v. City of
Tigard])
[358 - 359]
III. THE "CONTRACT"
CLAUSE
A. The "Contract"
Clause: The so-called "Contract" Clause (Art. I, ?10) provides that "no
state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of
contracts." The clause effectively applies to both federal and state
governments. The Clause has a different meaning depending on whether the
government is impairing its own contracts or contracts between private
parties. [360]
1. Public contracts: If the
state is trying to escape from its own financial obligations, then the
Court will closely scrutinize this attempt. Here, the state attempt to
"weasel" will be struck down unless the modification is
"reasonable and necessary to support an important public
purpose" (basically middle-level review). [361]
2. Private contracts: But when
the state is re-writing contracts made by private parties, the judicial
review is not so stringent. Here, even a substantial modification to
contracts between private parties will be allowed so long as the state
is acting "reasonably" in pursuit of a "legitimate public
purpose." So we apply what is basically "mere
rationality" review in this situation. (Example: If a state's
economy is in shambles with widespread home mortgage foreclosures, the
state probably may temporarily order a lower interest rate on home
mortgages, or impose a moratorium on mortgage repayments, without
violating the Contract Clause.) [361 - 363]
a. Incidental effect on
contracts: Even this "mere rationality" standard applies
only where the state takes an action that is specifically directed at
contractual obligations. If the state applies a "generally
applicable rule of conduct" that has the incidental by-product of
impairing contractual obligations, the Contract Clause does not apply at
all. [364]
Example:
Suppose Manco, a manufacturing company located outside the state of
Texahoma, contracts with Disposal Corp., which operates a toxic waste
disposal facility within Texahoma. The contract runs through the year
2000, and allows Manco to deliver up to 1,000 tons of toxic waste per
year to the dump. The Texahoma legislature then enacts a statute that,
effective immediately, prohibits anyone from disposing of any
additional toxic wastes within the state. Even though this enactment
has an effect on the Manco-Disposal contract, it does not trigger Contract Clause review at all,
because the statute affects contracts as an incidental by-product,
rather than being specifically directed at contractual obligations.
IV. EX POST FACTO LAWS
A. Constitutional prohibition: Article I prohibits both state and
federal governments from passing any "ex post facto" law. An ex
post facto law is a law which has a retroactive punitive effect. So
government may not impose a punishment for conduct which, at the time it
occurred, was not punishable. Also, government may not increase the
punishment for an offense over what was on the books at the time of the
act. [365]
Example: On June
1, Joe smokes a cigarette in a public building. On June 10, the state
legislature makes it a crime, for the first time, to smoke in a public
building. Because of the ban on ex post facto laws, Joe cannot be
convicted of the June 1 smoking, since it was not a crime at the time he
did it. The same would be true if the legislature on June 15 increased the
penalty for such smoking over what it was on June 1.
1. Criminal only: The ban on ex
post facto laws applies only to measures that are "criminal"
or "penal," not to those that are civil. Basically, this means
that only measures calling for imprisonment will come within the ex post
facto ban (so a measure that imposes, say, disbarment, or one that
imposes deportation, can be made retroactive, since these sanctions are
civil). See, e.g., Galvan v. Press.
V. BILLS OF ATTAINDER
A. Generally: Art. I prohibits both the
federal government and the states from passing any "bill of
attainder." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
"applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to punish them without a judicial
trial." (Example: Congress prohibits the payment of salaries to three
named federal agency employees, on he grounds that they are engaged in
subversive activities. This is an invalid bill of attainder, since it
applies to named or easily-identified individuals, and punishes them
without a judicial trial. [U.S. v. Lovett]) [367]
Chapter 12 and 13
THE "STATE ACTION" REQUIREMENT; CONGRESS' ENFORCEMENT OF THE CIVIL
WAR AMENDMENTS
I. STATE ACTION
A. State action generally:
Virtually all of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
to individuals are protected only against interference by the government.
We summarize this rule by referring to the requirement of "state
action." But sometimes, even a private individual's act will be found
to be "state action" that must comply with the Constitution.
There are two main doctrines that may lead a private act to be classified
as state action; if either of these doctrines applies, then the private
action is "state action" even if the other doctrine would not
apply. The two doctrines are the "public function" doctrine and
the "state involvement" doctrine. [375 - 378]
B. "Public function"
doctrine: Under the "public function" approach to state action,
if a private individual (or group) is entrusted by the state to perform
functions that are governmental in nature, the private individual becomes
an agent of the state, and his acts constitute state action. [379 - 383]
1. Political system: The
electoral process is a "public function," and is thus state
action. Therefore, the carrying out of primary elections is state
action, even if the acts are directly carried out by "private"
political parties. (Example: A state convention of Democrats (in
essence, a "private" political party) rules that only whites
may vote in the Texas Democratic Primary. Held, this racial restriction
is "state action", and therefore violates the 15th Amendment. The primary is an
integral part of the election scheme, and the running of elections is
traditionally a "public function", so the running of the
primary is state action even though it is directly carried out by
private groups. [Smith v. Allwright]) [379]
a. Company town: Similarly,
operation of a "company town" is a "public
function," and thus is state action, because towns are usually
operated by the government. [379 - 381]
b. Parks: Operation of a park
is usually deemed a governmental function, so generally the operation
of a park will constitute "state action" under the
"public function" doctrine. Therefore, even if the park is
being operated by private persons, it must still obey constitutional
constraints (e.g., it can't be operated for whites only). [Evans v. Newton]. [381]
2. The "exclusively
public" requirement: Apparently, the function must be one that
traditionally has been "exclusively" a public function, in
order for the "public function" doctrine to apply. [381 - 383]
Example: A warehouseman has a
warehouseman's lien on goods stored with him, to cover unpaid storage
charges. He sells the goods pursuant to the warehouseman's lien, and the
owner claims that due process was required because the resolution of
disputes is a "public function". Held, the warehouseman's lien
and sale was not a "public function" because the resolution of
disputes between private individuals is not traditionally an
"exclusively" governmental activity - for instance, the
parties might have agreed to private arbitration. [Flagg Bros. v. Brooks]. [382]
C. "State involvement"
doctrine: Even if the private individual is not doing something that's
traditionally a "public function," his conduct may constitute
state action if the state is heavily involved in his activities. This is
the "state involvement" branch of state-action doctrine. Here
are some of the ways in which the state and private actor can be so
closely involved that the private person's acts become state action: [383]
1. Commandment: The state may
become responsible for the private party's actions because it commanded,
i.e., required, the private party to act in that way. (Example: The
state enforces a private agreement among neighbors that none will sell
his house to a black. Because the state has lent its state judicial
enforcement mechanism to this otherwise private contract, the
combination of enforcement and private discrimination violates equal protection. [Shelley v. Kraemer] [383 - 386]
2.
Encouragement: If the state "encourages" the private party's
actions, then the private action will be converted into state action.
(Example: The voters of California amend their constitution toprohibit
the state government from interfering with any private individual's
right to discriminate when he sells or leases residential real estate.
This amendment immediately results in the repeal of two state Fair
Housing statutes. Held, this state-constitutional amendment amounts to
governmental "encouragement" of private discrimination.
Therefore, the resulting private discrimination will be imputed to the
state, and the state constitutional provision violates the 14th Amendment. [Reitman v. Mulkey]) [386]
3. Symbiosis:
There is state action if there exists between the state and private
actor a "symbiotic" relationship, i.e., a relation between the
two that is mutually beneficial. (Example: A Wilmington, Delaware city
agency owns and runs a parking garage complex. The agency gives a 20
year lease to a privately-operated restaurant located in the complex.
The restaurant refuses to serve African Americans. Held, African
Americans who are refused service have had their equal protection rights violated. The
relation between the restaurant and the publicly-run garage was so close
and symbiotic - the garage wouldn't have been able to operate viably
without rents from the restaurant - that the restaurant's actions must
be imputed to the state, and therefore constitute state action. [Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority]) [386 - 387]
4.
Entanglement: State action may arise from the fact that the state is so
"entangled" with a private actor that even though the state
doesn't benefit from the private actor's conduct, the conduct will still
be treated as state action. This is true where the state and the private
party act together to carry out the action being challenged. [387 - 391]
Example 1:
State law allows a creditor to tie up a debtor's property while the debt
is being litigated; the procedure involves a writ of attachment issued
by the court clerk and executed by the sheriff. Held, the entire
attachment process works only because state officials actively
participate, so the actions of the private party - the creditor - will
be deemed to be state action.) [Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co.]
[389]
Example: The state regulates
all utilities. A private utility cuts off plaintiff's service without
notice or a hearing, and this fact is known to the state, which does
not object. Held, the utility's conduct was not state action, because
the state merely acquiesced in that conduct, rather than actively
participating in it. [Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.]
II. CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF
CIVIL RIGHTS
B. Congress' power to reach
private conduct: The special enforcement powers let Congress reach a lot
of private conduct that it could not reach by means of any other
congressional power. [398 - 404]
1. 14th and 15th Amendments:
When Congress enforces the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it has
some, but not unlimited, power to reach private conduct. So Congress
could, for instance, make it a crime for somebody to interfere with a
state official who is trying to guarantee another person's equal protection rights or voting
rights. (Example: Congress can make it a crime for D to prevent a school
principal from allowing African Americans to enroll in an all white
school.) [398 - 401]
2. 13th Amendment: But the
13th Amendment is different. ?1 of the 13th
Amendment provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime ... shall exist within the
United States." ?2 gives Congress the
power to "enforce this [amendment] by appropriate
legislation." The 13th Amendment, unlike the 14th and 15th, is not explicitly
limited to governmental action. Indeed, that's the most important
thing to remember about the 13th Amendment, and its principal use
today - it's practically the only clause in the entire Constitution
that prevents one private citizen from doing something to another. So
the 13th Amendment gives Congress important authority to reach certain
private conduct that it couldn't reach through the 14th and 15th
Amendments. [401 - 403]
a. "Badges of
slavery": If the 13th Amendment only meant that
Congress could take special action to ensure that slavery itself, in
its most literal sense, shall be wiped out, the Amendment wouldn't
be of much practical use today. But instead, the Supreme Court has
held that the Amendment allows Congress also to stamp out the
"badges and incidents" of slavery. In fact, Congress has
the power to determine what the "badges and incidents of
slavery" are, so long as it acts rationally - once Congress
defines these "badges and incidents", it can then forbid
them. [402 - 403]
Example: In
1866, Congress passes a statute, 42 U.S.C. ?1982, which provides
that "all citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every state and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property." In a modern case, the Ps argue that the
statute prevents D (a private developer) from refusing to sell them
a house solely because they are African American.
Held, this
statute applies to block discrimination by D, a private citizen.
Furthermore, the statute is constitutional under the 13th Amendment. ?2 of the 13th
Amendment, which gives Congress enforcement powers under that
amendment, gives Congress the power to make a rational determination
of what the badges and incidents of slavery are. Here, Congress
could have rationally concluded that barriers to enjoyment of real
estate, and discrimination in housing, are relics of slavery. [Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.] [402 - 403]
b.
Ancestry, ethnic discrimination: As we've just seen, the 13th Amendment clearly lets
Congress prevent private discrimination against African Americans,
on the grounds that it's a "badge or incident" of slavery.
All other racial minorities are also protected - Congress could
probably even bar private racial discrimination against whites based
on the 13th Amendment (though the Court has never explicitly decided
this). But it's not clear whether private discrimination based on
non-racial grounds (e.g., ancestry, ethnic background, religion,
sex, etc.) can be barred by Congress acting pursuant to the 13th
Amendment. [402]
c. Must
have statute: The application of the 13th Amendment to a broad range of
"badges and incidents of slavery" applies only where
Congress has used its enforcement powers by passing a statute that
relies on the Amendment. If private citizen A discriminates against
B on the basis of race, but the type of discrimination is not one
that Congress has outlawed, then the 13th Amendment's
"naked" or "self-executing" scope won't be
enough to reach that discrimination. Probably actual peonage - the
keeping of a person as a slave - is the only type of private racial
discrimination that is directly barred by the 13th Amendment in the
absence of a congressional statute. [403]
C. Congressional power to
modify constitutional rights, or to prevent constitutional violations:
Congress does not have the power to redefine the scope of the rights
protected by the Civil War amendments in a way that is different from
the way the Supreme Court would define their scope. [407]
Example: The Supreme Court
issues a decision defining the First Amendment
Establishment Clause more narrowly than the Court had previously
defined that clause. Congress doesn't like this decision. It therefore
passes the "Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,"
which in effect says that all state and local governments must refrain
from any action that would have violated the Establishment Clause
under the earlier, now-overruled, cases. Held, Congress has no power
to either expand or contract the scope of constitutional rights, so
the Act is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power. [City of Boerne v.
Flores]
2. Remedial
powers: Because Congress has the power to "enforce" the
Civil War amendments, it may prohibit certain actions that don't
directly violate these amendments, if it reasonably believes that
these actions would lead to violations of the amendments. That is,
Congress has broad "remedial" powers. [405]
a. "Congruent and
proportional": But when Congress purports to use its remedial
powers to redress or prevent a constitutional violation, Congress'
action has to be "proportional and congruent" to the
threatened violation. If not, the Congressional action is invalid. [City of Boerne v.
Flores] [409]
Example:
Congress makes the states, when they act as employers, obey the same
age-discrimination rules as private employers. Congress says that
it's doing this under authority of its 14th Amendment ?5
remedial powers, to prevent violations by the states of
older employees' equal protection rights. Held,
Congress went beyond the scope of its ?5 remedial powers, because
there was no evidence that the states routinely violated older
workers' equal protection rights. Therefore, Congress' regulation
was not a "congruent and proportional" response to any
threatened constitutional violations. [Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents]
Chapter 14
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
I. GENERAL THEMES
A. Text of First Amendment: The
First Amendment provides, in part, that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." [417]
1. Related rights: There are
thus several distinct rights which may be grouped under the category
"freedom of expression": freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, and of petition. Additionally, there is a well-recognized
"freedom of association" which, although it is not
specifically mentioned in the First Amendment, is derived from
individuals' rights of speech and assembly.
B. Two broad classes: Whenever
you consider governmental action that seems to infringe upon the freedom
of expression, there's one key question that you must always ask before
you ask anything else. That question is, "Is this governmental
action 'content-based' or 'content-neutral'?" If the action is
"content-based," the government's action will generally be
subjected to strict scrutiny, and the action will rarely be sustained.
On the other hand, if the action is "content-neutral", the
government's action is subjected to a much less demanding standard, and
is thus much more likely to be upheld. [417 - 419]
1. Classifying: A
governmental action that burdens a person's expression is
"content-based" if the government is aiming at the
"communicative impact" of the expression. By contrast, if
the government is aiming at something other than the communicative
impact of the expression, the government action is
"content-neutral", even though it may have the effect of
burdening the expression.
Example 1 (content-based):
Virginia forbids pharmacists to advertise the prices of prescription
drugs, because it's afraid that the public will buy drugs at the
lowest available price and will therefore receive low-quality goods
and services. This government ban is "content-based", since
the speech is being regulated because of the government's fears about
how consumers will respond to its communicative impact. Therefore, the
government's ban will be strictly scrutinized, and is in fact
violative of the First Amendment. [Virginia Pharmacy Bd.
v. Virginia Consumer Council] [419]
Example 2
(content-neutral): A city forbids the distribution of all leaflets,
because it wishes to prevent littering. This ban is "content
neutral" - the government is banning all leaflets, regardless of
their content, and the harm sought to be avoided (littering) would
exist to the same extent regardless of the message in the leaflets.
Therefore, the government action is subject to less rigid review -
more or less "intermediate level review" (though it was
still struck down on these facts.) [Schneider v. State] [419]
Example: Suppose a consumer
in the prescription-drug case above didn't speak English. He
wouldn't suffer the harm the state was trying to prevent - being
induced to buy bad drugs or bad service for a cheap price - even if
he saw or read the advertising, so it's clearly the content of the
communication that the state is objecting to. But in the case of the
ban on littering, even a whole city of non-English-speakers would
suffer the same harm - littered streets - so the ban is
content-neutral.
b. Motive counts: When a
court decides whether a regulation is content-based or
content-neutral, motives count for everything - the question is what
the state really intends to do. If the court believes that the state
intends to inhibit certain speech because of its message, the court
will treat the statute as content-based (and strictly scrutinize it)
even though it is neutral on its face.
C. Analysis of content-based
government action: Once we've determined that a particular government
action impairing expression is "content-based", we then have
to determine whether the expression falls within a category that is
protected by the First Amendment.
1. Unprotected category: If
the speech falls into certain pre-defined unprotected categories, then
the government can basically ban that expression completely based on
its content, without any interference at all from the First Amendment. [422]
b. Not totally unprotected:
But even speech falling within an "unprotected category"
receives one small First Amendment protection:
government must regulate in a basically content-neutral way.
(Example: The state may ban all "fighting words." But it
may not choose to ban just those fighting words directed at the
listener's race, religion, or other enumerated traits. [R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul])
2. Protected category: All
expression not falling into one of these five pre-defined categories
is "protected". If expression is protected, then any
government ban or restriction on it based on its content will be
presumed to be unconstitutional. The Court will subject any
content-based regulation of protected speech to strict scrutiny - the
regulation will be sustained only if it (1) serves a compelling
governmental objective; and (2) is "necessary," i.e., drawn
as narrowly as possible to achieve that objective (since a
broader-than-needed restriction wouldn't be a "necessary"
means.) [420 - 422]
Example: A District of
Columbia statute bans the display of any sign within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy, if the sign would bring the foreign government into
"public disrepute". Held, this regulation is content-based,
since a sign is prohibited or not prohibited based on what the sign
says. Therefore, the regulation must be strictly scrutinized, and
cannot be upheld. Even if the government's interest in protecting the
dignity of foreign diplomats is compelling - which it may or may not
be - the statute is not "necessary" to achieve that
interest, since a narrower statute that only banned the intimidation,
coercion or threatening of diplomats would do the trick. [Boos v. Barry]. [422]
a. Religious speech gets
equal protection: The requirement of content-neutrality is now so
strong that it seems to take precedence over the Establishment
Clause (which protects separation of church and state). Thus if the
government allows private speech in a particular forum, it may not
treat religiously-oriented speech less favorably than
non-religiously-oriented speech.
D. Analyzing content-neutral
regulations: Now, let's go back to the beginning, and assume that the
government restriction is content-neutral.
b. Narrowly tailored:
Second, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve that
governmental interest. So if there's a somewhat less restrictive way
to accomplish the same result, the government must use that
less-intrusive way. (Example: Preventing littering is a significant
governmental interest. But the government can't completely ban the
distribution of handbills to avoid littering, because the littering
problem could be solved by the less restrictive method of simply
punishing those who drop a handbill on the street. [Schneider v. State])
c.
Alternative channels: Finally, the state must "leave open
alternative channels" for communicating the information.
(Example: Suppose a city wants to ban all billboards. If a political
advertiser can show that there's no other low-cost way to get his
message across to local motorists, this billboard ban might run
afoul of the "alternative channels" requirement.)
E. Overbreadth: The doctrine of
overbreadth is very important in determining whether a governmental
regulation of speech violates the First Amendment. A statute is
"overbroad" if it bans speech which could constitutionally be
forbidden but also bans speech which is protected by the First
Amendment. [439 - 442]
1. Standing: To see why the
overbreadth doctrine is important, let's first consider how a litigant
attacks the constitutionality of a statute outside the First Amendment area. Here, the
litigant can only get a statute declared unconstitutional if he can
show that it's unconstitutional in its application to him. But the
overbreadth doctrine lets a litigant prevail if he can show that the
statute, applied according to its terms,would violate the First Amendment rights of persons not
now before the court. So overbreadth is really an exception to the
usual rule of "standing" - under the usual standing rules, a
person is not normally allowed to assert the constitutional rights of
others, only his own.
2.
"Substantial" overbreadth: In cases where the statute is
aimed at conduct that has expressive content (rather than aimed
against pure speech), the overbreadth doctrine will only be applied if
the overbreadth would be "substantial". In other words, the
potential unconstitutional applications of the statute must be
reasonably numerous compared with the constitutional applications.
[440 - 442]
F. Vagueness: There is a second
important First Amendment doctrine: vagueness. A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if the conduct forbidden by it is so
unclearly defined that a reasonable person would have to guess at its
meaning. [442]
1. Distinguish from
overbreadth: Be careful to distinguish vagueness from overbreadth:
they both leave the citizen uncertain about which applications of a
statute may constitutionally be imposed. But in overbreadth, the
uncertainty is hidden or "latent," and in vagueness the
uncertainty is easily apparent. [442]
Example: Statute I prohibits
anyone from "burning a U.S. flag as a symbol of opposition to
organized government." Statute II prohibits anyone from
"burning a U.S. flag for any purpose whatsoever." Statute I
is probably unconstitutionally vague, because there's no way to tell
what the statute means by "symbols of opposition to organized
government." Statute II is unconstitutionally overbroad - it's
obviously not vague, since it's perfectly clear that it bans all flag
burning. But since by its terms it appears to apply to
constitutionally-protected conduct (e.g., burning that's intended as a
political expression), and since there's no easy way to separate out
the constitutional from unconstitutional applications, it's overbroad.
II. ADVOCACY OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT
A. Advocacy of illegal conduct:
Remember that one of our "unprotected categories" is the
advocacy of imminent illegal conduct. The government can ban speech that
advocates crime or the use of force if (but only if) it shows that two
requirements are met [427 - 439]:
III. TIME, PLACE AND MANNER
REGULATIONS
A. Time, place and manner
generally: Let's now focus on regulations covering the "time, place
and manner" of expression. This is probably the area of Freedom of
Expression on which you are most likely to be tested, since tese kinds
of regulations are quite often found in real life. When we give you the
rules for analyzing "time, place and manner" restrictions
below, assume that the speech that is being restricted is taking place
in a public forum. (If it's not, then the government has a somewhat
easier time of getting its regulation sustained; we'll be talking about
these non-public forum situations later.) [447]
a. Content-neutral: First,
it has to be content-neutral. In other words, the government can't
really be trying to regulate content under the guise of regulating
"time, place and manner".
Example: City enacts an
ordinance allowing parades or demonstrations "to protest
governmental policies" to be conducted only between 10 a.m. and
4 p.m. No such restrictions are placed on other kinds of parades or
demonstrations. Even though this restriction is ostensibly merely a
"time, place and manner" restriction, it violates the
requirement of content-neutrality, because the restriction applies
to some expressive conduct but not others, based on the content of
the speech.
b. Narrowly tailored for
significant governmental interest: Second, it's got to be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. (We saw this
above when we were talking more generally about the analysis of all
content-neutral restrictions on speech.) This basically means that
not only must the government be pursuing an important interest, but
there must not be some significantly less intrusive way that
government could achieve its objective.
Example: Suppose the
government wants to prevent littering on the streets. Even though
prevention of littering is an important governmental objective, the
government may not simply ban all distribution of handbills, because
there is a significantly less restrictive means of achieving this
objective - a direct ban on littering - so the ban on handbills is
not "narrowly tailored" to achieving the anti-littering
objective.)
Example: City is a
medium-sized city, with six public parks and many streets. City
enacts an ordinance stating that any parade or demonstration, no
matter what the content of the message, shall take place only in
Central Park or on Main Street. City argues that its limited budget
for police security, and the greater ease of handling crowds in
these two places than in other places, justify the ordinance. Even
though this time, place and manner restriction is apparently
content-neutral and is arguably narrowly tailored for a significant
governmental interest, it probably violates the "leave open
alternative channels" requirement because it puts off limits
for parades and demonstrations the vast majority of locations within
City.
2. Application to conduct:
These rules on when the state may regulate the "time, place and
manner" of expression apply where what is being regulated is pure
speech. But much more importantly, these rules apply where the state
is regulating "conduct" that has an expressive component. So
the state can never defend on the grounds that "We're not
regulating speech, we're just regulating conduct." [449 - 450]
Example: It's
"conduct" to hand out handbills, or to form a crowd that
marches down the street as part of a political demonstration. But
since both of these activities have a major expressive component, the
state cannot restrict the conduct unless its satisfies the three-part
test described above, i.e., the restriction is content neutral, it's
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest, and
it leaves open alternative channels.
3. "Facial" vs.
"as applied": A "time, place and manner"
regulation, like any other regulation impinging upon First Amendment rights, may be
attacked as being either "facially" invalid or invalid
"as applied." Thus even a time, place and manner restriction
that has been very carefully worded to as to satisfy all three
requirements listed above may become unconstitutional as applied to a
particular plaintiff. [453]
Example: A
City ordinance provides that any parade or demonstration participated
in by more than five people shall be held only after the purchase of a
permit, which shall be issued by the City Manager for free to any
applicant upon two days notice. The City Manager normally issues such
permits without inquiring into the nature of the demonstration planned
by the applicant. P, who is known locally as an agitator who opposes
the current city government, applies for a permit. The City Manager
denies the permit, saying, "I don't like the rabble rousing
you've been doing." Even though the ordinance on its face is
probably a valid time, place and manner restriction, the application
of the ordinance to P's own permit request violates P's First Amendment rights, because that
application is not being carried out in a content-neutral manner.
B. Licensing: Be especially
skeptical of governmental attempts to require a license or permit before
expressive conduct takes place. [451 - 454]
1. Content-neutral:
Obviously, any permit requirement must be applied in a content-neutral
way. (Example: Local officials give permits for speeches made for
purposes of raising money for non-controversial charities, but decline
to give permits for demonstrations to protest the racism of local
officials. The requirement of content neutrality in the licensing
scheme is not being satisfied, and the scheme will be automatically
struck down.) [451]
2. No excess discretion:
Also, the licensing scheme must et forth the grounds for denying a
permit narrowly and specifically, so that the discretion of local
officials will be curtailed. (Example: A municipal ordinance cannot
require a permit for every newspaper vending machine where the permit
is to be granted on "terms and conditions deemed necessary by the
mayor" - the grounds for denying a permit must be set forth much
more specifically, to curb the official's discretion. [Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ. Co.]) [452]
4. Right to
ignore requirement: Assuming that a permit requirement is
unconstitutional, must the speaker apply, be rejected, and then sue?
Or may he simply speak without the permit, and then raise the
unconstitutionality as a defense to a criminal charge for violating
the permit requirement? The answer depends on whether the permit is
unconstitutional on its face or merely as applied. [453 - 454]
a. Facially invalid: If the
permit requirement is unconstitutional on its face, the speaker is
not required to apply for a permit. He may decline to apply, speak,
and then defend (and avoid conviction) on the grounds of the permit
requirement's unconstitutionality.
b. As applied: But where
the permit requirement is not facially invalid, but only
unconstitutional as applied to the speaker, the speaker generally
does not have the right to ignore the requirement - he must apply
for the permit and then seek prompt judicial review, rather than
speaking and raising the unconstitutionality-as-applied as a
defense. (However, an exception to this rule exists where the
applicant shows that sufficiently prompt judicial review of the
denial was not available. )
C. Right to be left alone:
People have no strong right to be left alone, and the government
therefore can't regulate broadly to protect that right. As a general
rule, it's up to the unwilling listener (or viewer) to avoid the
undesired expression. [454]
Example: A city can't make it a
misdemeanor to walk up and down the street handing advertising brochures
to people without the recipient's express consent. (It's up to the
recipient to decline the handbill).
1. Captive audience: But if
the audience is "captive" (unable to avert their eyes and
ears), this makes it more likely that a fair degree of content-neutral
regulation will be allowed. (However, the fact that the audience is
captive is just one factor in measuring the strength of the sate
interest in regulating.) [455]
D. Canvassing: A speaker's
right to canvass, that is, to go around ringing doorbells or giving out
handbills, receives substantial protection. [457 - 459]
1. Homeowner can say
"no": The individual listener (e.g., the homeowner), is
always free to say, "No, I don't want to speak to you about
becoming (say), a Jehovah's Witness." The city can then make it a
crime for the speaker to persist.
Example: A city passes an
ordinance providing that "All doorbell ringing for the purpose of
handing out handbills is hereby forbidden." Held, such an
ordinance violates the First Amendment, even if (as the city
claims) it is a content-neutral ordinance designed to protect
unwilling listeners, such as those who work nights and sleep days. The
most the city can do is to provide that once the individual homeowner
makes it clear he doesn't want to be spoken to, the speaker must honor
that request. [Martin v. Struthers]
3. Time,
place & manner: But the authorities may impose "time, place
& manner" limits on canvassing, if these limits: (1) are
content-neutral; (2) serve a significant governmental interest; and
(3) leave open adequate other channels for communication. (Example: A
town might prohibit canvassing after 6:00 PM, if its policy is truly
content-neutral (e.g., it wasn't enacted for the purpose of silencing
Jehovah's Witnesses), is enacted to protect homeowners' night-time
tranquility, and allows solicitation to take place at other times.)
E. Fighting words: One of our
other "unprotected categories" consists of "fighting
words." "Fighting words" are words which are likely to
make the person to whom they are addressed commit an act of violence,
probably against the speaker. Expression that falls within the
"fighting words" category can be flatly banned or punished by
the state. [Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire] [459 - 461]
Example: D
picks out one member of his audience and calls him a liar, racist and
crook. D can be arrested for this speech, because thee are words which
might well provoke a reasonable person to whom they are addressed into
physically attacking D.)
c. Dislike of speaker's
identity: The doctrine doesn't apply where it's the mere identity or
lawful acts of the speaker, rather than his threatening words, that
moves the crowd to anger. (Example: If D is a black civil rights
worker speaking in a small southern town with a history of racial
violence, the fact that members of the audience are ready to attack
D because they hate all black civil rights activists will not
suffice to make D's speech "fighting words" - here the
anger is not really coming from the speaker's particular threatening
words, but from his identity and his lawful advocacy of change.)
[461]
F. Offensive language: Language
that is "offensive" is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment. [462 - 465]
1. Profanity: This means that
even language that is profane may not be banned from public places.
(Example: D wears a jacket saying "Fuck the Draft" in the
L.A. County Courthouse. D cannot be convicted for breaching the peace.
The state may not ban language merely because it is
"offensive," even if profane. [Cohen v. Cal.]) [462 - 464]
Example: Congress bans the
use of the Internet to display any "indecent" language or
images which may be accessed by minors. Held, this statute is
unconstitutional, because it restricts the First Amendment rights of adults to
receive indecent-but-not-obscene material. [Reno v. ACLU] [479]
2. Racial or religious
hatred: Similarly, this means that messages preaching racial or
religious hatred are rotected (at least if they don't incite imminent
violence or come within the "fighting words" doctrine).
(Example: A member of the American Nazi Party tells a
predominantly-Jewish audience, "Jews are the scum of the earth
and should be eliminated." D cannot be punished for, or even
restricted from, saying these words.) [464 - 465]
3. Limits: But offensive
language can be prohibited or punished if: (1) the audience is a
"captive" one (e.g., the speech occurs on a city bus or
subway); or (2) the language is "obscene," under the formal
legal definition of this term (lewd and without socially redeeming
value).
G. Regulation of "hate
speech": Government efforts to regulate "hate speech" -
for instance, speech attacking racial minorities, women, homosexuals, or
other traditionally disfavored groups - are likely to run afoul of the First Amendment for being
content-based. [466 - 472]
1. No content-based
regulation: The government may choose to ban all hate speech. But
government may not select certain hateful messages based upon their
target or their narrow content, because such selection triggers the
strict scrutiny reserved for content-based regulations. This is true
even if government is trying to regulate only "fighting
words," which as noted above form an unprotected category. [466 -
467]
Example: St. Paul, Minnesota,
makes it a crime to "place on public or private property a symbol
? characterization or graffiti [including a burning cross or Nazi
swastika] which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender...." D is prosecuted for having burned
a homemade cross inside the fenced yard of a black family, in the
middle of the night.
Held, D cannot be convicted,
because the ordinance on its face violates the First Amendment. Even though the
ordinance has been construed by the state court to reach only
"fighting words," the city may not choose which fighting
words to prohibit based on their content. So the city may ban all
fighting words, but not just those motivated by, say, racial or
religious bias. [R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul]
a. Penalty-enhancement
statutes allowed: But government may attack bias by a "penalty
enhancement" approach, under which existing crimes like
assault, vandalism or arson are punished more severely if the
prosecution shows that the crime was motivated in part by one of a
listed set of biases. (Example: If the sentence for assault is
ordinarily 2 years, a state may raise it to 7 years where D picks
his victim based on the victim's race. [Wisconsin v.
Mitchell]) [469]
H. Injunctions against
expressive conduct: Where the restriction on expression is in the form
of an injunction issued by a judge, there is a special standard of
review. When a court issues an injunction that serves as a kind of
"time, place and manner" restriction, the injunction will be
subjected to slightly more stringent review than would a
generally-applicable statute or regulation with the same substance: the
injunction must "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant governmental interest." [Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.] [472]
a. Content-based: If a
regulation is content-based, it makes no difference whether the
expression is or is not in a public forum: strict scrutiny will be
given to the regulation, and it will almost never be upheld.
b. Neutral "time,
place & manner": It's where a regulation is content-neutral
that the existence of a public forum makes a difference; especially
regulations on "time, place & manner" are less likely
to be upheld where the expression takes place in a public forum.
[482]
i. Non-public forum: When
expression takes place in a non-public forum, the regulation
merely has to be rationally related to some legitimate
governmental objective, as long as equally effective alternative
channels for the expression are available.
ii. Public forum: When
the expression takes place in a public forum, by contrast, the
regulation has to be narrowly drawn to achieve a significant
governmental interest (roughly intermediate-level review). It is
necessary, but not sufficient, that the government also leaves
alternative channels available. [482]
Example 1 (public forum
speech): A city says, "No political campaign messages may be
presented in handbills distributed on city streets." Since
this rule impairs communications in a public forum (city streets),
the city will have to show that its ordinance is necessary to
achieve a significant governmental interest, which it probably
can't do (anti-littering won't be enough, for instance). The city
can't say, "Well, TV or radio ads will let the same message
be given" - the existence of alternative channels for the
communication is necessary, but is not enough, when the expression
takes place in a public forum.
Example 2 (non-public
forum speech): A city says, "No political campaign messages
may be displayed on privately-owned bilboards, even with the
consent of the owner." Here, no public forum is involved.
Therefore, as long as adequate alternative channels are available
(which they probably are, e.g., radio & TV ads), the city only
has to show that its regulation is rationally related to some
legitimate governmental objective. The city can probably meet this
burden (e.g., by pointing to the objective of beautifying the
city.)
a. "True" or
"traditional" public forums: First, there are
"true" or "traditional" public forums. These are
areas that are public forums by custom and tradition, not by virtue
of any particular government policy. The classic examples are: (1)
streets; (2) sidewalks; and (3) parks. [485]
places where
government meetings take place that the government has decided to
open to the public at large (e.g., a school board meeting held in
a school auditorium);
places that government
has decided may be used by a broad range of people or groups
(e.g., school classrooms after hours, under a policy that lets
pretty much any group use them, or a municipal theater that any
group may rent).
i. Same rules: The same
rules apply to designated public forums as apply to true public
forums, except that government can change its mind and remove the
designation (in which case the place becomes a non-public forum
that can be subjected to much broader viewpoint-neutral
regulation, as described below).
c. Non-public-forums: Still
other public places are not at all associated with expression
traditionally, so they can be treated as non-public forums. Here,
the government regulation just has to be rationally related to some
legitimate governmental objective, as long as the interference with
speech is not "substantial." And if alternative channels
are available, then this fact alone usually makes the interference
"insubstantial." So we basically use "mere
rationality" review for content-neutral "time, place &
manner" regulations of non-public-forum expression that leave
open alternative channels of communication. [486 - 493]
i. All expression banned:
Often, even a regulation that completely bans expression in a
particular non-public forum will be found to satisfy this
"mere rationality" test. Or, the government can choose
to forbid discussion of certain subjects (but not certain
viewpoints). (Example: A publicly-owned airport terminal is not a
public forum. Therefore, the government may ban face-to-face
solicitation of funds in the terminal, because such a ban is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objectives of
reducing congestion and combating fraud. (However, a total ban
even on literature distribution will not be upheld, because this
ban does not even satisfy the "mere rationality"
standard.) [Int'l Soc. for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee])
ii.
Illustrations of non-public-forums: Here are some illustrations of
facilities that, even though they are owned by the government, are
not public forums: airport terminals, jails, military bases, the
insides of courthouses, school classrooms used after hours by
certain groups (but not if government has made the rooms available
to practically all comers, because then it's a designated public
forum), and governmental office buildings. [489 - 493]
J. Access to private property:
In general, a speaker does not have any First Amendment right of access to
another person's private property to deliver his message. Most
significantly, a person does not have a First Amendment right to speak
in shopping centers. [Hudgens v. NLRB] (Example: State
trespass laws may be used to prevent a person from conducting an
anti-war demonstration or a religious proselytizing campaign at her
local privately-owned shopping center.) [493 - 496]
IV. REGULATION OF SYMBOLIC
EXPRESSION
A. Symbolic expression: Let's
consider "symbolic expression," i.e., expression that consists
solely of non-verbal actions. [496 - 503]
1. Standard: We use
essentially the same rules to analyze restrictions on symbolic
expression as we do for restrictions that apply to verbal speech, or
to verbal speech coupled with conduct. Thus: (1) any attempt by
government to restrict symbolic expression because of the content of
the message will be strictly scrutinized and almost certainly struck
down; (2) any restriction on the time, place or manner of symbolic
expression will have to be narrowly tailored to a significant
governmental objective and will have to leave open alternative
channels. [496]
Example: The Ds (high school
students) wear armbands to school, in the face of a school policy
forbidding students from wearing such armbands. Because school
officials were motivated by a desire to suppress particular messages -
anti-war messages - the ban must be strictly scrutinized, and is
struck down. [Tinker v. Des Moines
Schl. Dist.] [498]
2. Flag
desecration: The most interesting example of government regulation of
symbolic expression is flag desecration statutes. The main thing to remember
is that if a statute bans flag desecration or mutilation, and either
on the statute's face or as it is applied, the statute is directed
only at particular messages, it will be invalid. (Examples: Both the
Texas and federal flag burning statutes have been struck down by the
Supreme Court. In the case of the federal statute, the Court concluded
that Congress was trying to preserve the flag as a "symbol of
national unity." The statute was therefore content-based, so the
Court struck it down. [U.S. v. Eichman]) [503]
V. DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF
PRIVACY
A. Defamation: The First Amendment places limits on the
extent to which a plaintiff may recover tort damages for defamation.
[510]
1. New York Times v. Sullivan
test: Most importantly, under the rule of New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where P is a public official, he may only
win a defamation suit against D for a statement relating to P's
official conduct if P can prove that D's statement was made either
"with knowledge that it was false" or with "reckless
disregard" of whether it was true or false. These two mental
states are usually collectively referred to as the "actual
malice" requirement. [511 - 513]
Example: The
New York Times runs an ad saying that P - the Montgomery, Alabama
police commissioner - has terrorized Dr. Martin Luther King by
repeatedly arresting him. Even if these statements are false, P cannot
recover for libel unless he can show that the Times knew its
statements were false or acted with reckless disregard of whether the
statements were true or false. [N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, supra].
2. Public
figures: This rule of New York Times v.
Sullivan - that P can only recover for defamation if he shows
intentional falsity or recklessness about truth - applies not only to
public "officials" but also to public "figures".
Thus a well known college football coach, and a prominent retired Army
general, were public figures who had to show that the defendant acted
with actual malice. [Assoc. Press v. Walker] [512]
a. Partial public figure:
Someone who voluntarily injects himself into a public controversy
will be a public figure for just that controversy - thus an
anti-abortion activist might be a public figure for any news story
concerning abortion, but not for stories about, say, his private
life unrelated to abortion.
b. Involuntary public
figure: Also, some people may be "involuntary" public
figures. (Example: A criminal defendant is an involuntary public
figure, so he cannot sue or recover for a news report about his
crime or trial unless he shows actual malice).
3. Private figure: If the
plaintiff is a "private" (rather than "public")
figure, he does not have to meet the New York Times v.
Sullivan "actual malice" rule. [Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.]. On the other hand, the First Amendment requires that he
show at least negligence by the defendant - the states may not
impose strict liability for defamation, even for a private-figure
plaintiff. Id. [513 - 514]
B. Intentional infliction of
emotional distress: The New York Times v.
Sullivan rule applies to actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress as well as ones for defamation. Thus a
public-figure plaintiff cannot recover for any intentional infliction
of emotional distress unless he shows that the defendant acted with
actual malice. (Example: Hustler Magazine satirizes religious leader
Jerry Falwell as a drunken hypocrite who has sex with his mother.
Held, Falwell cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress unless he shows that Hustler made a false statement with
knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of falsity. [Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell]) [516]
C. Falsity:
The First Amendment also probably
requires that the plaintiff (whether or not she is a public figure)
must show that the statement was false. [516]
VI. OBSCENITY
A. Obscenity: Another of our
"unprotected categories" is obscenity. Expression that is
obscene is simply unprotected by the First Amendment, so the states can
ban it, punish it, or do whatever else they want without worrying
about the First Amendment. [517 - 525]
B. Three-part
test: For a work to be "obscene," all three parts of the
following test must be met [518]:
1. Prurient interest:
First, the average person, applying today's community standards,
must find that the work as a whole appeals to the
"prurient" interest;
3. Lacks value: Finally,
the work taken as a whole, must lack "serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." [Miller v. Cal.]
C. Significance: So something
will not be "obscene" unless it depicts or describes
"hard core sex". (For instance, mere nudity, by itself, is
not obscene.) [519]
D. Materials addressed to
minors: It will be much easier for the state to keep erotic materials
out of the hands of minors. Probably even minors have some First Amendment interest in receiving
sexually explicit materials, but this is typically outweighed by the
state's compelling interest in protecting minors against such
material. So the distribution of non-obscene but sexually explicit
materials may basically be forbidden to minors (provided that the
regulations do not substantially impair the access of adults to these
materials). [521]
1. Adult's rights impaired:
But if a measure aimed at minors does substantially impair the
access of adults to material that's "indecent" but not
obscene, the measure will be struck down. (Example: If Congress bans
all "indecent" material on the Internet (as it has done),
out of a fear that the material will be seen by minors, there's a
good chance the measure will be found to violate the First Amendment rights of adults.)
[479]
E. "Pandering": The
issue of whether the materal appeals primarily to prurient interests
may be influenced by the manner in which the material is advertised -
if the publisher or distributor plays up the prurient nature of the
materials in the advertising, this will make it more likely that the
materials will be found to appeal mostly to prurient interests and
thus to be obscene. The advertisement itself, and expert testimony
about the likely effect of the advertising, may be admitted into
evidence to aid the determination on obscenity. (The marketing of
materials by emphasizing their sexually provocative nature is often
called "pandering.") [523]
F. Private possession by
adults: The mere private possession of obscene material by an adult
may not be made criminal. [Stanley v. Georgia]. [520]
Example:
While police are lawfully arresting D at his house on a robbery
charge, they spot obscene magazines on his shelf. D may not be
criminally charged with possession of pornography, because one has
both a First Amendment right and a privacy
right to see or read what one wants in the privacy of one's own home.
2. No right
to supply to consenting adults: Also, the state may punish a person
who supplies pornography even to consenting adults. In other words,
there is a right to have pornography for one's own home use, but not
a right to supply it to others for their home use. [520]
VII. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Commercial speech
generally: Speech that is "commercial" - that is, speech
advertising a product or proposing some commercial transaction - gets First Amendment protection. But this
protection is in some ways more limited than the protection given to
non-commercial (e.g., political) speech.[525]
1. Truthful speech:
Truthful commercial speech gets a pretty fair degree of First Amendment protection. The
government may restrict truthful commercial speech only if the
regulation (1) directly advances (2) a substantial governmental
interest (3) in a way that is "no more extensive than
necessary" to achieve the government's objective. So basically,
we apply mid-level
review to government restrictions based on the content of commercial
speech (whereas we apply strict scrutiny to conten-based
restrictions on non-commercial speech). [531]
Example: Virginia forbids a
pharmacist from advertising his prices for prescription drugs.
Virginia must show that it is pursuing a "substantial"
governmental interest, and that materially-less-restrictive
alternatives are not available. Here, the state's desire to prevent
price-cutting that will lead to shoddy service is not strong enough
to qualify as "substantial," so the measure must be struck
down on First Amendment grounds. [Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council] [526 - 527]
2. False,
deceptive or illegal: On the other hand, false or deceptive
commercial speech may be forbidden by the government. Similarly,
speech which proposes an illegal transaction may be forbidden (e.g.,
advertisements for cocaine). [531]
a. Harmful: But if the
product or service is harmful but lawful, the state may not limit
advertising about it any more than the state may limit advertising
about a non-harmful product - the right to ban product X does not
necessarily include the "lesser" right to regulate
speech about product X. (Example: Congress is free to ban casino
gambling entirely. But if Congress allows such gambling, it may
not limit advertising of casino gambling unless the limitation
passes the mid-level review standard, summarized above, that
applies to regulation of truthful commercial speech. [Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting v. U.S.]) [535]
3. No overbreadth: The
overbreadth doctrine does not apply in commercial speech cases,
because advertisers are thought not likely to be "chilled"
by overly broad governmental regulation of speech. Therefore, a
commercial enterprise that is protesting a regulation of speech must
show that the regulation infringes the enterprise's own speech, not
merely that the regulation would curtail speech not now before the
court. [536]
B. Lawyers: The qualified First Amendment protection given to
commercial speech means that lawyers have a limited right to
advertise. Thus a state may not ban all advertising by lawyers or even
ban advertising directed to a particular problem. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz.
(Thus a lawyer can advertise, "If you've been injured by a Dalkon
shield, I may be able to help you.") [527 - 529]
1. In-person solicitation:
On the other han, the states may ban certain types of in-person
solicitation by lawyers seeking clients (e.g., solicitation of
accident victims in person by tort lawyers who want to obtain a
contingent-fee agreement. [Ohralik v. Ohio St.
Bar Ass'n.]) [527]
VIII. SOME SPECIAL CONTEXTS
a. Allowable regulation:
Thus a school may ban profanity. It may also ban the school
newspaper from running stories that would disturb the school's
educational mission (e.g., stories about sex and birth control
that the principal reasonably believes are inappropriate for
younger students at the school). [Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier]
B. Group activity: The rights
of a group to engage in joint expressive activity get special First Amendment protection, generally
called the "freedom of association". (Example: Groups have
the right to get together to bring law suits, or to conduct
non-violent economic boycotts. Therefore, they cannot be prevented
from doing these things by state rules against fomenting litigation or
conducting boycotts. [NAACP v. Button]) [545]
C. Campaign
spending: The state or federal governments can regulate campaign
spending to some extent, but other campaign regulations would violate
the First Amendment. [547 - 552]
2.
Expenditures: But a person's independent campaign-related expenditures
(whether he's a candidate or not) may not be limited. (Example: A
candidate may not be prevented from spending as much of his own money
on getting elected as he wishes. Similarly, private citizen X may
spend as much money to try to get Y elected as he wishes, as long as X
spends the money in a truly independent manner rather than
contributing it to Y or coordinating with Y on how it should be spent.
Buckley v. Valeo, supra.) [549]
3. Ballot
measure: A person has a First Amendment right to spend as
much as he wants and however he wants in connection with a ballot
measure. (Example: The insurance industry can spend as many millions
as it wants, and organize those expenditures however it wants, in
order to defeat a proposal that would roll back car insurance rates.)
[552]
D. Government as speaker or as
funder of speech: So far, we've looked only at the role of government as
the regulator of speech by non-government actors. But sometimes,
government itself wishes to speak. And sometimes, government wishes to
give financial support to certain speech by others. In these two
contexts - government as speaker, and government as funder of speech -
government seems to have at least somewhat greater ability to prefer one
viewpoint over another than it does when it merely regulates. [553]
1. Government as speaker:
When government wishes to be a speaker itself, it is pretty clear that
government may say essentially what it wants, and is not subject to
any real rule of viewpoint neutrality. [553]
b. Competitive awards: But
suppose that government gives awards to a few speakers on account of
their special artistic or technical merit, and does this as part of
a competitive process. Here, probably government can take into
account the speaker's message in deciding who should get the award,
at least where the award process doesn't seem designed to punish
unpopular views. (However, the rules in this area are very unclear.)
[553]
IX. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, AND
DENIAL OF PUBLIC BENEFITS OR JOBS
A. Freedom of association
generally: First Amendment case law recognizes the
concept of "freedom of association". In general, the idea is
that if an individual has a First Amendment right to engage in a
particular expressive activity, then a group has a "freedom of
association" right to engage in that same activity as a group.
[554]
1. Right not to associate:
Individuals and groups also have a well-protected "right not to
associate." Thus any government attempt to make an individual
give financial support to a cause she dislikes, or to make a group
take members whose presence would interfere with the group's
expressive activities, will be strictly scrutinized. [555 - 559]
B. Illegal membership: The
freedom of association means that mere membership in a group or
association may not be made illegal. Membership in a group may only be
made part of an offense if: (1) the group is actively engaged in
unlawful activity, or incites others to imminent lawless action; and (2)
the individual knows of the group's illegal activity, and specifically
intends to further the group's illegal goals. (Example: Congress cannot
make it a crime simply to be a member of the American Communist Party.
On the other hand, Congress can make it a crime to be a member of a
party that advocates imminent overthrow of the government, if the member
knows that the party so advocates and the member intends to help bring
aout that overthrow.) [559]
C. Denial of public benefit or
job: Freedom of expression also prevents the government from denying a
public benefit or job based on a person's association. [559 - 565]
2. No
right/privilege distinction: There is no constitutional distinction
between a "right" and a "privilege." Even if, say,
a particular public benefit or job is defined by the state to be a
"privilege," the state may not deny that job or benefit on
the basis of the applicant's constitutionally-protected membership in
a group or organization. [559]
3. Loyalty
oath: Government may generally not require an applicant to sign a
loyalty oath, unless the things that the applicant is promising in the
loyalty oath not to do are things which, if he did them, would be
grounds for punishing him or denying him the job. (Example: You cannot
be required to sign a loyalty oath that you are not a member of the
Communist Party in order to get a teaching job. But you can be
required to sign an oath that you will not advocate the forcible
overthrow of our government.) [561]
4. Compulsory
disclosure: Similarly, the government may not force you to disclose
your membership activities (or require a group to disclose who its
members are), unless it could make that membership illegal. (Example:
The state cannot require the Communist Party to furnish a list of its
members.) [565 - 567]
5. Some
exceptions: There are some exceptions to the general rule that
associational activities that couldn't be outlawed directly also can't
be made the basis for public hiring or benefits decisions. In general,
these exceptions are for conduct which, although it includes protected
expression, directly (and negatively) relates to performance of the
job.
a. Partisan political
activities: For instance, civil servants can constitutionally be
forced to choose between their jobs and engaging in partisan
political activities, since there's a very strong government
interest in making sure that civil servants can do their jobs
without being coerced into campaigning for or contributing to their
elected bosses. [CSC v. Letter
Carriers].
Example: Even
though I have a First Amendment right to be a
Democrat, the Republican Congressman representing my district doesn't
violate my rights when, on the basis of my political beliefs, he
declines to hire me as, say, a speech writer, a high advisor, or some
other post with a heavy
political content. On the other hand, if I'm a Democrat, and there's a
Republican governor in power, he can't block me from getting a
government job as a clerk or secretary or police officer - the old
fashioned "patronage" system whereby all public jobs could
be restricted to supporters of the party in power has been outlawed as
a violation of freedom of association, and only jobs with a heavy
political content, like speech writer, say, or Chief of Staff, can be
based on party membership.
i. Independent contractors:
The same rule - that party affiliation may be used if and only if
the performance is reasonably related to one's politics - applies to
people and companies doing work for government on an
independent-contractor basis. [561] (Example: P has a contract to
haul trash for City. Even if the contract is at-will, City can't
decline to renew it on the grounds that P belongs to the wrong
political party or has supported the Mayor's opponent.)
c. Speech critical of
superiors or otherwise inappropriate: An employee gets only limited
protection for speech or associational activities that are critical of
superiors, or otherwise inappropriate for the workplace. Where the
speech involves a matter of "public concern," the court will
balance the speech rights of the employee and the government's
interest as employer in promoting efficiency on the job. Where the
speech does not involve a matter of public concern, the court gives
great deference to the employer's judgment. [Connick v. Myers] [562 - 563]
Example: P, a
government clerical worker, hears that John Hinckley has tried to
shoot Pres. Reagan, and says, "If they go for him again, I hope
they get him." P is fired for the remark. Held, for P. This
remark was intended as political commentary and was thus on a matter
of "public concern," so P could not be fired unless the
remark heavily affected P's job performance, which it did not. [Rankin v. McPherson]
X. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEDIA
A. The media (and its special
problems): Here is a brief review of some special problems related to the
media: [571 - 585]
1. Prior restraint: In general,
the government will not be able to obtain a prior restraint against
broadcasters or publishers. In other words, only in exceptionally rare
circumstances may the government obtain an injunction against the
printing or airing of a story, and the government will almost never be
allowed to require that a publisher or broadcaster obtain a permit
before it runs a story. [573 - 577]
i. Participants: But the
judge may usually order the participants not to speak to the press.
For instance, a state may prevent a lawyer from making any statement
which would have a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing" a trial or other court proceeding. [Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada] [578]
2. Subpoenas by government: The
press does not get any special protection from government demands that
the press furnish information which other citizens would have to
furnish. In particular, if a reporter has information that is of
interest to a grand jury, the reporter may be required by subpoena to
disclose that information to the grand jury even though this would cause
him to violate a promise of confidentiality to a source. [Branzburg v. Hayes] (But the state is
always free to enact a "shield law" making such subpoenas
illegal under some or all circumstances.) [579 - 581]
a. Right to attend trials:
However, the media does have a constitutionally protected right to
attend criminal trials. This right is not absolute - the government
can close the media (and the public) out of a trial if it shows that
there is an "overriding" government interest being served by
a closed trial, and that that interest cannot be served by less
restrictive means. [Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia] [583]
i. Showing rarely made: But
this showing will rarely be made, so that as a practical matter the
press is usually entitled to attend a criminal trial. (Example: A
state statute automatically bars the press from hearing any trial
testimony by a minor who was allegedly the victim of a sex crime.
Held, the statute unduly interferes with the public's right of
access to criminal trials. [Globe Newspapers v.
Sup. Ct.])
Chapter 15
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two clauses: There are two
quite distinct clauses in the First Amendment pertaining to
religion.[599]
B. Applicable to states: Both the
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses by their terms only restrict
legislative action by Congress. However, both clauses have been
interpreted to apply also to the states, by means of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
Therefore, you don't have to worry whether the government action in
question is federal or state - the same standards apply to each. [599]
C. Conflict:
Occasionally, the Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses seem to
conflict on particular facts. That is, a religious group may be asking for
some government benefit; if the benefit is given, there may be an
Establishment Clause problem. Yet if the benefit is not gven, this may be
a burdening of religion. When the two clauses seem to conflict, the Free
Exercise Clause dominates. In other words, if a particular benefit or
accommodation to religion is arguably required by the Free Exercise
Clause, then when government grants that accommodation or benefit it is
not violating the Establishment Clause.
Example: A public
university makes meeting rooms available to all sorts of student groups.
If the university allows religious groups to use the room, there might be
an Establishment Clause problem. But if it doesn't allow religious groups
to use the rooms, while allowing non-religious groups to do so, there
might be a Free Exercise Clause problem. Consequently, it will not be an
Establishment Clause violation for the university to allow the religious
groups to use the rooms. [599]
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. General rule: The overall
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to put a wall between church and
state. In other words, the government must stay out of the business of
religion, and religious groups must to some extent stay out of the
business of government. [599 - 600]
a. Official church: Congress
cannot establish an "official religion of the United
States". In fact, Congress probably couldn't even declare that
"the American people believe in God," because the
Establishment Clause means that government may not prefer or endorse
religion over non-religion.
b. Go to church: The
government cannot force people to worship. In fact, the state can't
even intentionally encourage people to worship - for example, it
cannot decide that it wants to promote church attendance, and then
give people a special tax deduction that applies to church donations
but not to other charitable donations. (But it could, as Congress
does, give a general tax deduction for charitable contributions, and
let contributions to churches be eligible. This would be allowable
because the government is treating religion the same as non-religion,
not preferring religion over non-religion.)
c. Preference of one religion
over another: The government cannot intentionally prefer one religion
over another religion. For instance, a state may not decide that since
Christians are in the majority, it will allow tax deductions for
contribution to Christian churches but not for contributions made,
say, to synagogues.
d. Participate: Government
may not actively participate in religious affairs, or allow religious
organizations to have a special participation in government affairs.
For instance, Congress probably could not constitutionally use public
officials and public polling places to run an election to determine
the next head of the American Presbyterian Church - this would be an
undue governmental entanglement in religious affairs.
B. Three-part test: Government
action that has some relationship to religion will violate the
Establishment Clause unless it satisfies all three parts of the following
test (known as the "Lemon" test, from Lemon v. Kurtzman) [600]:
1. Purpose: First, the
government action must have a secular legislative purpose. In other
words, there must be some governmental purpose that has nothing to do
with religion. (If there is both a religious and a non-religious
purpose, then this prong is probably satisfied.)
Example: Alabama passes a
statute saying, "Every public school student shall have the
opportunity to engage in silent prayer or meditation for at least two
minutes at the start of every school day." If there is evidence
that the legislature was motivated solely by a desire to help students
pray, then the statute will be struck down (and in fact such an Alabama
statute was struck down. [Wallace v. Jaffree]) This is true even if
many of the students who take advantage of the statute engage in
non-religious meditation - if the sole purpose was to aid religion,
that's enough to make the government action void.
3.
Entanglement: Finally, the governmental action must not foster an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. (Example:
Massachusetts lets a church veto the issuance of a liquor license to any
premises located within 500 feet of the church. Held, this statute
violates the Establishment Clause, because it entangles churches in the
exercise of governmental powers. [Larkin v. Grendel's Den])
C. Religion and the public
schools: If the government tries to introduce religion into the public
schools, it is probably violating the Establishment Clause. [601 - 608]
1. Instruction: Thus the
government may, of course, not conduct religious instruction in the
public schools. In fact, it can't even allow privately-employed
religious teachers to conduct classes on the public schools' premises
during school hours. [601 - 602]
a. Accommodation: However,
it's probably allowable for the government to allow students to leave
school early to attend religious instruction somewhere else. It's also
probably acceptable for government to let religious groups have access
to school facilities, as long as non-religious groups are given equal
access. Remember our example of the university that lets all kinds of
student groups, including religious groups, use meeting rooms - that's
permissible.
2. Prayer reading: The official
reading of prayers in the public schools will virtually always be
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale. That is, it will
almost always turn out to be the case that either the sole purpose, or
the primary effect, of the prayer reading is to advance religion. [603 -
605]
a. Moment of silence: Even
the setting aside of a "moment of silence" at the beginning
of the school day will generally violate the Establishment Clause,
since a moment-of-silence statute will usually turn out to have been
solely motivated by the legislators' intent to advance religion, or
will at least have the primary effect of advancing religion. (But this
will always turn on the actual purpose and effect of the particular
statute - there's no absolute per se rule against moments of silence.
[Wallace v. Jaffree] [603]
b. Prayer
reading at graduation: Similarly, the school may not conduct a prayer
as part of a graduation ceremony, at least where school officials can
fairly be said to be sponsoring the religious message. [Lee v. Weisman] [604 - 605]
c.
Student-selected speakers don't solve problem: The school can't easily
get around prayer-reading problems by having the student body elect a
student speaker, and then having that speaker decide whether to give a
prayer. As long as the school's process can be reasonably viewed as
supporting school prayer, the fact that a student-body election
intervenes is irrelevant. [Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe] [605]
3. Curriculum: The state may
not design or modify the curriculum of its schools in order to further
religion at the expense of non-religion, or to further one set of
religious beliefs over others. (Example: A state may not forbid the
teaching of evolution. [Epperson v. Ark.] Similarly, it probably
may not demand that "creationism" be taught in addition to
evolution, since "creationism" is mainly a religious doctrine
the teaching of which would have the primary effect of advancing
religion. [Edwards v. Aguillard]) [607 - 608]
4. Equal
reatment of religion and non-religion: But it's not a violation of the
Establishment Clause for government to treat religion and non-religion
equally in the schools (and government may in fact be required to do
this because of free-speech principles.) (Example: If a public
university funds non-religiously-oriented student publications, it must
fund an evangelical Christian publication on the same terms. [Rosenberger v. Univ. of
Virginia.]
)
D. Sunday closing laws: Laws
requiring merchants to be closed on Sundays generally do not violate the
Establishment Clause. The reason is that these "blue laws" have
a primarily secular effect and purpose - they permit everyone (Christian,
non-Christian and atheist alike) to have a uniform day of rest. [McGowan v. Md.]. [609 - 609]
E. Ceremonies and
displays: Any time your exam question involves a governmentally-sponsored
ceremony or display, beware of Establishment Clause problems. [611 - 616]
1. Ceremonies: Thus a ceremony
put on by the government may not have the sole purpose or primary effect
of advancing religion. (For instance, as noted above, the government may
not normally conduct a prayer as part of a high school graduation
ceremony.) [611 - 612]
a. Long-standing tradition:
However, if a particular ceremony has a long historical tradition
going back to the time when the Constitution was enacted, then it will
probably be allowable, especially outside of the public-school
context. (Example: The practice of opening a session of the
legislature with a prayer by the legislative chaplain dates back to
colonial days, so presumably the authors of the Bill of Rights thought
that it did not violate the Establishment Clause. Therefore, the
practice will be upheld. [Marsh v. Chambers])
b. Incidental
references: Similarly, the Establishment Clause probably is not
violated when the ceremony has an incidental reference to God or to a
religious theme. (Example: The Pledge of Allegiance, with the phrase
"One nation, under God," is probably allowable.)
2. Religious displays: Where a
display with religious themes is either put on by the government, or put
on by private groups using government property, there is a potential
Establishment Clause problem. The problem usually arises where there is
a "Christmas" display, "Easter" display, etc. Ask
yourself this question: Would a reasonable observer seeing the display
conclude that the government was endorsing religion? If so, there is a
violation of the Establishment Clause. [612 - 616]
a. Context: Context is very
important. If there is one religious symbol, but it is surroundedby
primarily-secular symbols, then the display would be taken as a whole
and probably does not violate the Establishment Clause. For instance,
if a nativity scene is surrounded by reindeer, Santa Claus,
"Season's Greetings" banners, etc., then as a whole the
display would seem to be primarily secular, and the nativity scene
won't be a violation of the Establishment Clause. [Lynch v. Donnelly]. But if the nativity
scene or other primarily-religious symbol stands by itself, then that
display probably will have a primarily religious effect, and thus
violate the Establishment Clause.
F. Intentional preferences
between denominations: The government may not intentionally prefer one
religion over another, or one sect over another. [616 - 618]
Example: The New York legislature
creates a special school district whose residents consist solely of
members of a particular orthodox Jewish sect, the Satmar Hassidim. The
purpose and effect of the special district is to let the Satmars get
public funding for a public school in their village to educate their
handicapped children. Held, the district violates the Establishment
Clause, because it was created in a way that singled out the Satmars for a
special preference not made available to other groups (and also because it
amounted to a delegation of state authority to a group chosen according to
a religious criterion.) [Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village v. Grumet] [616 - 617]
1. Unintended effect: But a
regulation that has the incidental unintended effect of helping one
religion or sect more than another, or hurting one more than another,
does not generally violate the Establishment Clause.
G. Aid to religious schools:
Whenever your fact patterns shows that the government is giving some sort
of financial aid to religious schools, you must immediately think
"Establishment Clause". And, of course, you must apply the
three-part test. [618 - 623]
a. Benefit to all students: A
government program that benefits all students, at public, private
non-parochial and parochial schools alike, is much more likely to pass
muster than aid which goes overwhelmingly to parochial-school
students;
3. Textbooks
and equipment: Similarly, textbooks and equipment (e.g., computers) may
be loaned to parochial school students as long as loans on the same
basis are made to public school and private non-parochial students. But
only books and materials that are strictly secular may be used (e.g.,
Bibles can't be lent out). [Bd. of Ed. v. Allen; Mitchell v. Helms] [620]
4. Teachers:
The state may send public school teachers into parochial schools, even
to teach basic academic subjects, as long as what's taught is free of:
(1) religious content and (2) influence from the parochial school's
administration. [Agostini v. Felton] [620 - 621]
5. Tax
benefits: The state may give tax benefits to parents who send their
children to non-public schools including parochial schools, at least if
the benefit scheme is neutral on its face (i.e., applies to
non-religious schools as well as religious ones). This is true even if
the benefits overwhelmingly go to the parents of religious school
students. [Mueller v. Allen] [622 - 623]
III. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Free Exercise generally: Let's
now turn to the second clause relating to religion, the Free Exercise
Clause. Under this clause, the government is barred from making any law
"prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. The Free Exercise
Clause prevents the government from getting in the way of people's ability
to practice their religions. [624 - 625]
a. Non-religious objectives:
Free Exercise problems most typically arise when government, acting in
pursuit of non-religious objectives, either: (1) forbids or burdens
conduct which happens to be required by someone's religious belief; or
conversely, (2) compels or encourages conduct which happens to be
forbidden by someone's religious beliefs.
Example (government
forbids conduct dictated by belief): The military prohibits any
soldier from wearing a hat (other than a regular military cap)
while on duty. This order prevents orthodox Jewish soldiers from
wearing yarmulkes, which their religion requires them to wear at
all times. (On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the Jewish
officer-plaintiffs had a free exercise right that was being
burdened, but that this right was outweighed by the need to defer
to the military's judgment that discipline and uniformity require
the ban on all non-standard headgear. [Goldman v.
Weinberger])
Example
(government compels or encourages conduct forbidden by the
belief): The state awards unemployment compensation only to
jobless workers who make themselves available for work Monday
through Saturday. This rule has a non-religious purpose (making
sure that only those whose employment is truly involuntary
collect). But the statute strongly encourages conduct that
violates the religious beliefs of some persons (e.g., Seventh Day
Adventists, for whom Saturday is the Sabbath). Therefore, the rule
raises significant free exercise problems. (In fact, the statute
was held to violate the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Seventh
Day Adventists. [Sherbert v. Verner]. The case is
discussed below.)
B. Intentional vs.
unintentional burdens: The Free Exercise Clause prevents the
government from unduly interfering with religion whether the
government does so intentionally or unintentionally.
Example: The Ps practice
Santeria, a religion involving animal sacrifice. D (the local city
council), motivated by the citizenry's dislike of this religion and
of the sacrifices, outlaws all animal sacrifice (but exempts Kosher
slaughter). Held, the Ps' Free Exercise rights have been violated. D
has acted with the purpose of outlawing a practice precisely because
the practice is motivated by religion, so D's act must be most
strictly scrutinized. Because there is no compelling state objective
here, and because any state objective that the state is pursuing
(e.g., maintenance of public health) could be achieved by less
discriminatory means, the law fails this strictest scrutiny. [Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. Hialeah]
2.
Unintentional burden: If government unintentionally burdens
religion, the Free Exercise Clause is still applied. Here, however,
the government action is not per se illegal. Instead, the Court
traditionally uses a somewhat less stringen form of strict scrutiny.
(But there are signs that the Court is cutting back on this strict
scrutiny for unintentional burdens on religion. For instance, if the
government makes certain conduct a crime, and this unintentionally
burdens the exercise of religion, the Court does not use strict
scrutiny, and instead uses "mere rationality" review.)
[626 - 631]
C. Coercion required: The
Free Exercise Clause only gets triggered where government in some
sense "coerces" an individual to do something (or not to do
something) against the dictates of his religion. If the government
takes an action that unintentionally happens to make it harder for you
to practice your religion - but without coercing you into taking or
not taking some action as an individual - the Free Exercise Clause
does not apply. [632]
Example: The federal
government, without intending to affect any religious practice, wants
to build a road. The effect will be to destroy Native American ritual
grounds.
Held, there is no impairment
of free exercise rights, because the Native American plaintiffs are
not being coerced into doing or not doing anything - external reality
is simply being changed in a way that makes it harder for them to
practice their religion. (But if government forbade the Native
Americans from using existing grounds to pray on, this would be a
violation, because the Native Americans would be coerced into not
taking some action of their own.) [Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Ass'n]
D. Denial of
benefits: One way the government may be found to have interfered with
a person's free exercise of religion is if the government denies the
person a benefit solely because of that person's religious beliefs or
practices. (Example: A state may not forbid practicing members of the
clergy from holding elective state office, because this imposes a
burden on the exercise of a religious belief. [McDaniel v. Paty])
E. Exemptions
required: Because strict scrutiny is traditionally given even to
unintentional impairments of religion, government must give an
exemption to avoid such an unintentional interference with religion,
if this could be done without seriously impairing some compelling
governmental interest. (Example: P is denied unemployment benefits
because he refuses to work on Saturday, his religion's holy day. Held,
the state must exempt P from the requirement of Saturday work as a
condition to unemployment benefits, since an exemption will not
seriously undermine any compelling governmental interest. [Sherbert v. Verner]) [627 - 629]
1. Criminal prohibition:
But there's a special, recent, rule in the area of criminal
prohibitions: A generally applicable criminal law is automatically
enforceable, regardless of how much burden it causes to an
individual's religious beliefs (assuming that the government did not
intend to disadvantage a particularreligion when it enacted its
law). [631 - 632]
2. No
serious impairment required: Also, even where no criminal
prohibition is involved, government does not have to tolerate a
serious impairment of some compelling governmental goal - here, no
exemption needs to be given, because strict scrutiny is satisfied.
(Example: Even if a religiously-affiliated university honestly
believes that its religion bars African Americans and whites from
studying together, government need not tolerate interference with
its compelling goal of eliminating racial discrimination, so
government does not need to exempt the university from
anti-discrimination laws.)
3. Cutting
back: In any event, all of free exercise law seems to be in the
process of being scaled back, so the general rule that government
must give an exemption where this can be done without seriously
impairing a compelling governmental interest, may be on its way out.
F. Conscientious objection:
Probably Congress must (as it does) give an exemption for military
service for conscientious objectors (i.e., those who believe that all
war is evil). [633]
1. Selective c.o.'s: But
Congress need not give an exemption to "selective" c.o.'s
(i.e., those who do not believe that all war is evil, but who
believe that the particular war in which they are being asked to
fight is evil). [Gillette v. U.S.]
G. Public health: Government
may have to sacrifice its interest in the health of its citizenry, if
individuals' religious dictates so require. [634]
1. Competent adult: Where
the case involves a competent adult, and only that adult's own
health is at stake, government may probably not force treatment on
the individual over his religious objection. (Example: A state
probably can't force a Jehovah's Witness to accept a blood
transfusion or other life-saving medical care over that person's
religious objections.)
3. Danger to others: Also,
if the case involves not only a health danger to the person
asserting a religious belief, but also a health danger to others,
then government probably does not have to give an exemption.
(Example: P may be forced to undergo a vaccination over his
religious objections. [Jacobson v. Mass.])
H. What constitutes a
religious belief: Only bona fide "religious beliefs" are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause. But "religious
beliefs" are defined very broadly. [634]
1. Non-theistic: For
instance, non-theistic beliefs are protected. That is, the belief
need not recognize the existence of a supreme being. (Example:
Public officials cannot be forced to take an oath in which they say
that they believe that God exists. [Torcaso v. Watkins])
2.
Unorganized religions: Similarly, unorganized or obscure religions
get the same protection as the major religions. In fact, even if a
person's religious beliefs are followed only by him, he's still
entitled to free exercise protection.
a. Unreasonableness: The
court will not consider whether the belief is "true" or
"reasonable". Even a very "unreasonable"
belief (that is, a belief that most people might consider
unreasonable) is not deprived of protection, so long as it is
genuine. [U.S. v. Ballard] (Example: The
practice of voodoo, including sticking pins into dolls
representing one's enemies, might be considered by most of us to
be "unreasonable." But as long as such a practice is
part of a person's genuine set of beliefs and religious practices,
it will not be deprived of protection merely because most find it
unreasonable.)
Chapter 16
JUSTICIABILITY
I. JUSTICIABILITY GENERALLY
A. List: In order for a case
to be heard by the federal courts, the plaintiff must get past a
series of procedural obstacles which we collectively call requirements
for "justiciability": (1) the case must not require the
giving of an advisory opinion; (2) the plaintiff must have standing;
(3) the case must not be moot; (4) the case must be ripe for decision;
and (5) the case must not involve a non-justiciable political
question. [645]
II. ADVISORY OPINIONS
A. Constitutional "case
or controversy" requirement: Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
gives the federal courts jurisdiction only over "cases" and
"controversies." The federal courts are therefore prevented
from issuing opinions on abstract or hypothetial questions. This means
that the federal courts may not give "advisory opinions". In
other words, the federal courts may not render opinions which answer a
legal question when no party is before the court who has suffered or
faces specific injury. [645]
Example:
Suppose that both houses of Congress approve a bill, but the President
has doubts about the bill's constitutionality. The President may not
go to a federal court and ask the federal court whether the bill is
constitutional, so that he may decide whether to veto it. If the
federal court were to give its opinion about whether the bill was
constitutional, at a time when no party who had been or might soon be
injured by the unconstitutionality was before the court, this would be
an "advisory opinion" that would violate the constitutional
"case or controversy" requirement.
1. Declaratory judgments
sometimes allowed: But declaratory judgments are sometimes allowed,
and are not forbidden by the rule against advisory opinions. A
declaratory judgment is a judicial decision in which the court is
not requested to award damages or an injunction, but is instead
requested to state what the legal effect would be of proposed
conduct by one or both of the parties. [646]
a. Requirements: But the
plaintiff is not entitled to get a declaratory judgment on just
any question about what the legal consequence of the particular
conduct would be. If the declaratory judgment action raises only
questions that are very hypothetical or abstract, the federal
court is likely to conclude that what's sought here is an illegal
advisory opinion, because no specific, concrete controversy
exists.
III. STANDING
A. Function of a standing
requirement: Probably the most important rule about when the federal
courts may hear a case is that they may do so only when the plaintiff
has "standing" to assert his claim. By this, we mean that
the plaintiff must have a significant stake in the controversy. [647 -
648]
Example: Suppose that during
the Vietnam War, P, a federal taxpayer, becomes convinced that, since
Congress has never formally declared war, P's tax dollars are being
used to support an unconstitutional war. If P were to sue the federal
government in federal court to have the war effort enjoined on this
ground, the court would not hear his claim - he would be found to lack
"standing," since (as we'll see in detail later) a person
whose only connection with the controversy is that he is a taxpayer
will almost never be deemed to have standing to claim that tax dollars
are being used illegally.
B. Requirement of
"injury in fact": The key concept behind the law of standing
is simple: the litigant must show that he has suffered an "injury
in fact." At its broadest level, the standing requirement means
that the plaintiff must show that he has himself been injured in some
way by the conduct that he complains of. [647]
C. Who is kept out: The
standing rules tend to keep two main types of cases out of the federal
courts: [648]
1. Non-individuated harm:
First, we have cases in which the harm suffered by the plaintiff is
no different from that suffered by very large numbers of people not
before the court. (Example: Suppose P's only connection with the
suit is that he is a ederal "citizen" or a
"taxpayer" who is injured the same as any other citizen or
taxpayer by the fact that the government is spending tax dollars
illegally or otherwise violating some law. P does not have
standing.)
2. Third parties' rights:
Second, we have cases where the rights claimed to be violated are
not the rights of the plaintiff, but instead the rights of third
parties who are not before the court. (But there are some important
exceptions to the general rule that the plaintiff can't complain of
government actions that violate someone else's rights.)
D. Taxpayer and citizen
suits: Here is the single most important context in which standing
problems arise: suits that are brought by federal "citizens"
or "taxpayers" arguing that their general rights as citizens
or taxpayers are violated by governmental action. [648 - 649]
1. Taxpayer suits: Suppose
that the plaintiff contends that: (1) he is a federal taxpayer; and
(2) his tax dollars are being spent by the government in some
illegal way. May the plaintiff pursue this suit in federal court? In
general, the answer will be, "no." The fact that a
person's federal taxes are used to fund an unconstitutional or
illegal government program is simply not a sufficient connection
with the governmental action to confer standing on the plaintiff. [Frothingham v.
Mellon]. [648]
2. Citizen suits: Suppose
now that plaintiff argues that he is a federal "citizen,"
and that as such he has the right to have his government act in
accordance with the Constitution. Assume that P has no direct
connection with the governmental act he's complaining about (he's
merely claiming that, like every other citizen, he has the right to
have the federal government obey the Constitution). In this
"citizen suit" situation, P will not have standing. The
Court has always held that one federal citizen's interest in lawful
government is no different from the interest of any other citizen,
and that an individual litigant relying on citizenship has not shown
the "individualized" injury-in-fact that is required for
standing. [649]
E. Cases not based on
taxpayer or citizen status: Now suppose that the plaintiff is not
arguing that his standing derives from his status as citizen or
taxpayer. In other words, we're now talking about the vast bulk of
ordinary law suits. [649 - 653]
1. Three requirements: Here,
there are three standing requirements that the plaintiff must meet:
(1) he must show that he has suffered (or is likely to suffer) an
"injury in fact"; (2) the injury he is suffering must be
concrete and "individuated," and (3) the action being
challenged must be the "cause in fact" of the injury. [649]
a. Non-economic harm: This
"injury in fact" requirement is pretty loosely applied.
For instance, the harm does not have to be economic in nature.
(Example: A group of people who use a national forest claim that the
construction of a recreation area in the forest will violate federal
laws. To get standing, the plaintiffs point to the injury to their
"esthetic and environmental well-being" which would result
from the construction. Held, this esthetic and environmental injury
satisfies the "injury in fact" requirement, even though
the harm is non-economic and in fact very intangible. [Sierra Club v.
Morton]) [650]
b. Imminent
harm: If P has not already suffered the injury in fact, he must show
that the future injury is not only probable but "concrete"
and "imminent." In other words, a vague sort of harm that
may come about in the indefinite future will not suffice. (Example:
The Ps challenge a federal regulatory action that they say will
endanger certain species abroad. The Ps say that they have in the
past, and will in the future, travel abroad to visit the habitats of
these species. Held, the Ps lack standing, because the lack of
specific information about their future plans means the harm to them
is not sufficiently concrete or imminent. [Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife]) [650]
i. Same harm: But
remember that if the harm complained of by the plaintiff is truly
the same harm as suffered by every citizen or every taxpayer in
the country, the harm will not be sufficiently
"individuated," and the plaintiffs won't have standing.
b. Organizations and
associtions: What about organizations and associations - does the
organization itself have to suffer the harm, or can it merely assert
that its members will suffer or have suffered the required harm? In
general, the answer is that organizations and associations will be
able to sue on behalf of their members. However: (1) the members
have to be people who would have standing in their own right (so
that an organization of citizens or taxpayers could not complain of
harm that is suffered by all citizens or taxpayers); (2) the
interests being asserted by the organization in the lawsuit must be
related to the organization's purpose (so that an environmental
group could probably not try to pursue its members' interests in,
say, an effective criminal justice system); and (3) the case cannot
be one which requires the participation of individual members. [Hunt v. Wash. Apple
Advt'g Comm.]. These three requirements are pretty liberally applied.
[651]
4. Causation: Finally, the
action that the plaintiff is complaining about must be the "cause
in fact" of his injury. Actually, this causation requirement
breaks down into two sub-requirements: (1) P has to show that the
challenged action was a "but for" cause of his injury, that
is, that the injury would not have occurred unless the challenged
action had taken place; and (2) P must show that a favorable decision
in the suit will probably redress the injury to him. [651 - 653]
F. Third-party standing: One of
the key functions of the standing doctrine is that this is how courts
apply the general rule that a litigant normally may not assert the
constitutional rights of persons not before the court. (This principle
is sometimes called the rule against use of "constitutional jus
tertii," - jus tertii means "rights of third persons" in
Latin.) [653]
Example: Zoning laws enacted by
the city of Penfield, N.Y., intentionally exclude the building of
low-income housing. The Ps are residents of nearby Rochester, who claim
that because Penfield has refused to allow low- and middle-income
housing, the taxes of these Rochester residents have risen, since
Rochester has to subsidize or build more low-income housing than it
would have to build than had Penfield not practiced exclusionary zoning.
Held, these Rochester residents
lack standing. It is true that their higher taxes are an "injury in
fact" to them. But Penfield's zoning laws do not apply to these
Rochester residents, and therefore do not violate their rights. And the
Rochester residents may not claim that the rights of other people not
before the court have been violated (e.g., people who would have moved
to Penfield had exclusionary zoning not been practiced). [Warth v. Seldin]) [652 - 653]
1. Not constitutionally
required: This rule against the assertion of third-party rights is not
mandated by the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement. In other words, it is not a rule
imposed by the Constitution on the federal courts; instead, it is a
rule of "prudence," a policy decision adopted by the Supreme
Court. [654]
a. Associations: One
exception is that an association will normally be allowed to raise
the rights of its members. For instance, if a group of people would
be injured by damage to the air they breathe and the water they
drink, an organization of which they are members (e.g., the Sierra
Club) would typically be allowed to sue on their behalf. [651]
b. Overbreadth: Another
sort of exception to the rule against third-party standing is the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, which we covered earlier in our discussion of freedom of
expression. Remember that the basic idea behind overbreadth is that
even where a statute could constitutionally be applied to the
plaintiff's conduct, if he can show that the statute would
unconstitutionally restrict the expression of some other person not
before the court, the court may hear the lawsuit and strike down the
statute. We allow overbreadth in the First Amendment area but not
elsewhere because statutes that purport to restrict expression in an
overbroad manner will have a "chilling effect" on
citizens' general willingness to exercise their freedom of speech.
[654]
IV. MOOTNESS
A. General rule: A case may not
be heard by the federal courts if it is "moot." A case is moot
if it raised a live controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but
events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an
ongoing stake in the controversy. [654]
Example: P sues D, a state
university, claiming that the university's law school admissions program
is racially discriminatory. P is permitted to attend the law school
while the case is being litigated. By the time the case arrives at the
Supreme Court for review, P is in his final year of law school, and the
university says that he will be allowed to graduate regardless of how
the case is decided. Held, the case is moot. Therefore, the appeal will
not be decided. [DeFunis v. Odegaard]
1. Constitutional basis for:
Apparently the rule that the federal courts may not decide
"moot" cases is required by the Constitution. That is,
deciding a case when the parties no longer have a live controversy
would amount to issuing an advisory opinion, in violation of Article III's "case or
controversy" requirement.
B. Exceptions: Nonetheless,
the courts recognize a few situations where a case that would appear
to be "moot" will nonetheless be heard. [654]
1. "Capable of
repetition, yet evading review": For instance, a case will
not be treated as moot if the issue it raises is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." This "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" doctrine takes care of
situations in which, if the case were to be declared moot, a
different person might be injured in the same way by the same
defendant, and his claim, too, would be mooted before review could
be had. [654]
Example: P, a pregnant
woman, attacks the constitutionality of Texas' anti-abortion law.
She brings the suit as a class action, in which she is the named
plaintiff and other pregnant women who want abortions are unnamed
members. By the time the case reaches the Supreme Court, P is no
longer pregnant.
Held, the case should not
be dismissed as moot. A pregnancy will almost always be over
before the usual appellate process is complete. Therefore, if the
Court insisted that the named plaintiff who starts the suit must
still be pregnant by the time the suit gets to the Supreme Court,
no plaintiff could ever get to that Court. So the
constitutionality of the Texas anti-abortion law is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." [Roe v. Wade]
2.
Voluntary cessation by defendant: The case will generally not be
treated as moot if the defendant voluntarily ceases the conduct
that the plaintiff is complaining about. So if the plaintiff is
seeking an injunction, the defendant can't usually get the case
dismissed on mootness grounds merely by saying that he has
voluntarily stopped the conduct that the plaintiff is trying to
get an injunction against - unless the defendant shows that there
is no reasonable likelihood that he will return to his old ways,
the court will let the action go forward. [655]
3.
Collateral consequences: Finally, a case will not be moot even if
it is mostly decided, if there are still collateral consequences
that might be adverse to the defendant. For instance, suppose that
a criminal defendant has already served his sentence by the time
his attack on the constitutionality of his conviction comes before
the federal court. The case will not be moot, because there will
probably be future collateral consequences to the defendant from
his conviction (e.g., he will lose the right to vote, his
reputation or employability will be damaged, etc.) [655]
V. RIPENESS
A. Ripeness problem
generally: You can think of the problem of ripeness as being the
opposite of mootness. A case is moot, as we've just seen, because it
no longer involves an actual controversy. By contrast, a case is not
yet ripe (and therefore not yet decidable by a federal court) if it
has not yet become sufficiently concrete to be easily adjudicated.
[655]
Example: The Hatch Act prohibits federal
executive-branch employees from getting involved in "political
management or...political campaigns." The plaintiffs are
federal civil servants who want to attack the constitutionality of
the Hatch Act. The plaintiffs claim that they want to engage in
prohibited political activities. But they concede that they have not
yet engaged in such activities.
Held, the
plaintiffs' claims are not yet ripe. The problem is not that the Ps
have not yet violated the statute. Rather, the problem is that the
plaintiffs have not been adequately specific about the precise acts
that they wish to carry out. (If the Ps would specify in detail what
they want to do, their suit might not be unripe even though they
haven't yet violated the act.) [United Public
Workers v. Mitchell]. [655]
B.
Uncertain enforcement of criminal statute: One common ripeness
problem arises where the plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of
a statute and says that he has violated the statute, but it is clear
that the statute is rarely enforced and probably will not be
enforced in this particular situation. Here, the rules are pretty
blurry - suffice it to say that if the court believes that it is
very unlikely that the statute will be enforced against the
plaintiff either for the activity he has already done or similar
activity he is likely to do in the future, the court will probably
treat the case as being not ripe.
Example: Connecticut
forbids the distribution of contraceptives. Two married couples and
a physician challenge the law's constitutionality, and allege that
they have violated the law. Held, the case is not ripe, because the
statute has been on the books for 80 years with only one reported
prosecution, so there does not exist the required "clear"
threat that the plaintiffs will be prosecuted. [Poe v. Ullman] [656]
1. Specific threatened
harm required: But for a case to be ripe, it is not necessary that
the litigant have already suffered harm. It will be enough that
there is a reasonable probability of harm. However, the
anticipated harm has to be fairly specific. [656]
VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND SUITS AGAINST THE STATES
A. The Eleventh Amendment
generally: The Eleventh Amendment specifically bars
any federal suit "against any one of the states by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state." [656]
a. Plaintiff not a
citizen of defendant state: By its own terms, the Amendment
clearly applies to suits against a state brought by citizens of
a different state or by foreigners. (Examples: A citizen of
Missouri may not bring a damage suit against the state of
Illinois. Nor may a British subject bring a damage suit against
the state of Illinois.)
b. Suit by citizen of
defendant state: The Eleventh
Amendment has been interpreted to apply also to bar a damage
suit where the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant state. [Hans v.
Louisiana] (Example: Suppose P is an employee of the Delmarva
state legislature. He is then fired, in apparent violation of
his employment contract. P brings a suit for contract damages
against Delmarva, in federal court. This suit would be a
violation of the Eleventh Amendment, as broadly interpreted by
the Supreme Court.)
3. No
counties or cities protected: Only the state itself, not its
subdivisions, such as counties or cities, is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. (Example: P, a
county worker, is fired. He brings a federal suit for contract
damages against the county. Since the suit is not against the
state per se, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply, even though
the county is in essence a subdivision of the state.)
4. No bar
against injunctions: The Eleventh Amendment essentially bars
only suits for damages. That is, it does not bar most suits for
injunctions. For instance, if a private litigant sues a state
official to enjoin him from taking acts which would violate the
plaintiff's constitutional or federal-law rights, the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply and the suit may proceed. [Ex parte Young]
Example:
Congress passes a statute saying any state can be sued in federal
court by private citizens for violating, say, federal patent or
environmental laws. This statute won't have any effect - a federal
court still can't hear a private suit against a state for damages
for violating the federal law. [Florida Prepaid v.
College Sav. Bank] [659]
a. Exception for
remedial powers: But there's an exception - if Congress is
acting properly pursuant to its remedial powers under the 13th, 14th or 15th Amendment, it may
abrogate the states' 11th Amendment immunity.
B. States' sovereign
immunity: The states have a constitutionally-guaranteed sovereign
immunity from private damage suits brought against the state in the
state's own courts. This is true even if the suit is based on a
Congressionally-granted federal right. [660 - 661]
Example: Congress passes a
valid statute saying that state employees must receive premium pay
for overtime just as private-sector employees do. Employees of Maine
sue the state in Maine courts on this right. Held, the
Constitution's structure incorporates the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, and that doctrine allows Maine to avoid hearing the
employees' suit, even if Congress has expressly said that the states
must hear such suits. [Alden v. Maine] [661]
VII. POLITICAL QUESTIONS
A. The doctrine generally:
The final aspect of justiciability is the requirement is that the
case not involve the decision of a "political question."
This rule is even more vague than the other justiciability rules
we've talked about already. The doctrine does not mean that federal
courts wil not decide a case that involves politics. It doesn't even
mean that courts will refuse to decide cases where political issues
are right at the heart of the controversy. Instead, the court will
decline to hear a case on political question grounds only if it
thinks that the doctrine of separation of powers requires this, or
if it thinks that deciding the case would be unwise as a policy
matter. [662]
a. Commitment to
another branch: First, the fact that the case presents an issue
which has been committed by the Constitution to another branch
of the federal government, i.e., to Congress or to the President
instead of the courts.
B. "Commitment to
other branches" strand: The courts will refuse to decide a case
on political-question grounds if the case raises an issue the
determination of which is clearly committed by the Constitution to
another branch of the federal government. [663 - 664]
Example: D, a federal
judge, claims that the Senate has used improper procedures in
convicting him following his impeachment, because the case was heard
before a committee of Senators rather than the full Senate (though
the full Senate voted, after receiving a transcript of the committee
proceedings). D claims that this violates the Impeachment Clause, which says that
"the Senate shall have sole Power to try all
Impeachments." Held, the case presents a nonjusticiable
political question, because the Constitution has given the Senate,
not the courts, the power to decide what constitutes a
"trial." [Nixon v. U.S.]
1. Other impeachment
issues: The same principle probably applies to all aspects of the
impeachment process. Thus if the House voted to impeach the
President and the Senate voted to convict, the Supreme Court would
probably refuse to review either of these decisions on
"commitment to other branches" political-question
grounds (so that if the President tried to get the Supreme Court
to hear his argument that the crime for which he was impeached and
convicted was not within the constitutionally-defined category of
"high crimes and misdemeanors," the Court would probably
refuse to consider the merits of this argument.)
C. "Lack of judicially
manageable standards": The second major factor that may lead
the court to decide that there is a non-justiciable political
question, is that there are no manageable standards by which the
courts can resolve the issue. [665]
Example: Article IV, Section
4
provides that "the United States shall guarantee to every state
in this union a republican form of government." Some unhappy
Rhode Island citizens stage a rebellion. Ultimately, various Rhode
Islanders ask the federal courts to decide which of two competing
factions is the lawful government of the state.
Held, the
Court cannot decide this question, because it presents a political
question. There are no criteria by which a court could determine
whether a particular "government" was
"Republican." [Luther v. Borden]
D.
Reapportionment: Let's now look in some detail at the federal cases
on legislative reapportionment. [666 - 669]
1. One person, one vote
rule: The landmark case of Baker v. Carr, and cases
following it, establish the so-called "one person, one
vote" principle: any governmental body, whether it's a
federal one (like congressional districts) or a state one (like a
state legislature) must be apportioned on a population basis, so
that all voters have essentially the same voting power. If a
governmental electoral scheme does not comply with this "one
person, one vote" principle, it violates the equal protection
rights of the under-represented voters. [Reynolds v. Sims]. [666 - 667]
a. Both houses of state
legislature: One of the consequences of the "one person,
one vote" principle is that if a state has a bicameral
(two-house) legislature, both houses must be elected based on
population. Thus, paradoxically, the U.S. Constitution prohibits
a state from having one body that awards seats without reference
to population (e.g., a house that gives the same number of votes
to each county), even though the U.S. Senate is built upon
exactly this kind of non-population-based scheme!
2. How much equality is
required: The rules for how much equality is required vary
depending on whether we're talking about a congressional
districting scheme or, instead, a state or local districting
scheme. [668]
a. Congressional: For
congressional districts, the districts have to be almost
precisely equal. Even a scheme where one congressional district
within a state was only 1% more populous than another has been
struck down. States must make a "good-faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality" in the drawing of
congressional districts. [Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler]
b.
State and local: Much greater deviation from mathematical
equality is allowed where what is being apportioned is state
legislatures or local governmental bodies. So for example, a 10%
or smaller deviation between the voting power of a voter in one
district versus a voter in another will generally be upheld. [White v.
Regester] Even greater disparities will be allowed if there are
good reasons for them. (For instance, suppose a state wants not
to have to redraw its county boundaries, and wants to have each
county elect its own representative to the state Assembly. This
desire to "respect pre-existing political boundaries"
will probably justify, say, a 15% or even 20% disparity in
per-person voting power.)
3. Gerrymandering:
Consider gerrymandering, that is, the process by which the
strength of a particular voting bloc is curtailed by restricting
its members to carefully and artificially-constructed districts.
It's very hard for a major political party to win a gerrymandering
suit against the other party. [669]
a. Racial minority: But
if a racial or ethnic minority can show that the gerrymandering
scheme was intentionally designed to hurt, and did hurt, that
minority, it will probably win an equal protection suit. See,
e.g., Gaffney v.
Cummings. For instance, if the state legislature draws
districts for the state senate in a way that intentionally gives
African Americans control of 5% of the districts when African
Americans constitute 10% of the state population, African
American voters have a good chance of winning an equal
protection suit.
|