Abstracts of reviews of Elster
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Engerman, Stanley L. (1980), Counterfactuals and the New Economic History (Review of Logic and Society), Inquiry [23 (2):157-172]
Engerman: Counterfactuals and the New Economic History
Abstract
In discussing Elster's views on the use of counterfactuals and on the nature of contradictions in
society, it is contended that, in general, these will not seem especially
controversial to those trained in neoclassical economics. Similarly, there is little
disagreement in principle between the views of many 'new economic historians' and
Elster on the use of counterfactuals in the study of historical problems. In evaluating Elster's
critique of several applications of counterfactuals in the 'new economic
history', it is argued that the concentration on broad philosophical questions may
obscure the point that much recent controversy is based upon disagreements concerning factual
issues and the nature of empirical relationships and magnitudes.
Lukes, Steven (1980), Elster on counterfactuals (Review of Logic and Society), Inquiry [23 (2):144-155]
Lukes: Elster on counterfactuals
Abstract
It is argued that, despite its considerable virtues, Jon Elster's approach to counterfactual
reasoning in history misfires in a number of ways. First, his classification of
the various approaches to the problem among logicians and philosophers is inadequate and
confusing: he claims to follow the meta-linguistic approach, uses the
idiom of the possible worlds approach but would be better advised, given his own
intuitions and purposes, to adopt the condensed argument approach. This would not
only make his argument clearer and less confusing: it would also improve it. It is
argued, secondly, that Elster makes exaggerated claims for his own 'branching
worlds' theory, which he does not show to be the 'correct' account of counterfactuals; this only
serves to relocate the central problem, since everything hinges on the
identification of branching points. Thirdly, it is argued that Elster is therefore led
into a mistaken account of when counterfactuals are illegitimate: he does not prove
that historical counterfactuals must be about real possibilities in the past, and that
we are not permitted to suppose, in contravention of our actual beliefs, that the
laws we accept are suspended in some specified sphere but otherwise applicable.
Markl, Karl-Peter (1980), Logic and truth finding in society and sociology (Review of Logic and Society), Inquiry [23 (2):173-185]
Markl: Logic and Truth-finding in Society and Sociology
Abstract
The question of sociological truth-finding is posed in the light of the view that logical
formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts,
where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the
stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires
its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the 'facts'. To this extent there
is a clear link with 'reality' or with a view of the world that is taken as factually
given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of
historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what
world-view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual -
and a significant or non-trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify
political agents and the proper entities within and through
which political action is performed? Finally, the problem-solving capacity of the
concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with
regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned.
Meikle, Scott (1986), Making Nonsense of Marx, Inquiry [29 (1):29-43]
Meikle: Making Nonsense of Marx
Abstract
Elster's understanding of Marx is reviewed in three areas: the theory of value, the
theory of history, and dialectics. In each area Elster goes astray in quite superficial
ways, not instructive ones. There is a simple underlying reason in almost every
case, viz. that Elster fails to confront the distinction in the philosophy of science
between the methods of atomism and essentialism. Since Marx was an essentialist,
Elster's attempt to assimilate Marx to the atomist tradition has as much serious
interest as attempts to show that Kant was a utilitarian, Hegel a classical empiricist,
or whales fishes. The conclusions are that the book is an unsympathetic treatment
of Marx, that it is lacking in scholarship and balance, and that the standard of
argument is unusually poor.
North, Douglas C. (1986), Is it worth Making Sense of Marx?, Inquiry [29 (1):57-63]
North: Is it worth Making Sense of Marx?
Abstract
This essay explores Elster's analysis of Marx's theory of historical evolution. The
meaning of the terms 'productive forces' and the 'relations of production' are
examined both as specified by Marx and interpreted by Elster. The essay then goes
on to demonstrate how the modern literature on transaction costs can provide a
more precise and useful framework within which to explore the ongoing tension
between productive forces and relations of production.
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1980), Akrasia and conflict (Review of Logic and Society), Inquiry [23 (2):193-212]
Rorty: Akrasia and Conflict
Abstract
As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions
for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia
and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character
of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing
the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of the
akratic alternative: its power to focus or dominate the agent's attention; its being
strongly habitual; its having the pull of social streaming: following the charismatic
leader, the mechanisms of sympathetic or antipathetic infection, the models of role
casting. Following these strategies is by no means pathological: these are relatively
automatic (though still voluntary) psychological functions. That is precisely their
power and attraction: they provide the conflicted akrates with an action solution,
though not one that accords with his preferred judgment.
Sandven, Tore (1995), Intentional Action and Pure Causality: A Critical Discussion of Some Central Conceptual Distinctions in the Work of Jon Elster, Philosophy of the Social Sciences [25 (3):286-317]
Sandven: Intentional Action and Pure Causality
Abstract
This article discusses fundamental problems in "rational choice theory," as
outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of why institutions may not be said to
act shows his fundamental presupposition that only "monolithic," unitary entities are capable of action. This is, for him, a reason why only individual human
beings may be said to act. Furthermore, human beings may be said to act only
insofar as they "maximize" (their "utility") on the basis of a unitary, complete,
consistent "preference structure." All action that is not maximization in these senses
is for Elster not really human action, but rather instances of "pure causality." Elster
distinguishes between the "'real," intentional person, who "maximizes," and
"purely causal forces" within the person. This article tries to show that this radical,
sharp dichotomy between "intentionality," in this narrow sense, and "pure
causality" is inadequate as a basis for understanding human action. This radical
dichotomy is central to important arguments made by Elster more generally.
Slaughter, Cliff (1986), Making Sense of Elster (Review of Making Sense of Marx), Inquiry [29 (1):45-56]
Slaughter: Making Sense of Elster
Abstract
Elster contends that much of Marx's most important work was characterized by
methodological individualism. I argue that this is untrue, and that to assert it
results, at least in part, from a misunderstanding of Marx's writings on the
individual's relation to his society. Central to Marx's writings is the rejection of an
abstract 'society'. Instead we find analysis of a particular social formation, with a
historically specific relation between individual and society, and between ends and
means. This is demonstrated from Capital and from earlier writings by Marx. In
Elster's critique of Marx's political economy, the same essentially historical content
of Marx's categories is not seen. The natural (or general) and the historical are
confused in Elster's argument on the theory of value. Elster's reconstruction of
Marx's concepts of class and class struggle is critically examined, from the
standpoint that class is a relation of exploitation, resting on property in the means
of production. In supposing that Marx was in some sense a functionalist, Elster
must once again be ignoring the historical core of Marx's thinking.
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. (1980), Is the prisoner's dilemma all of sociology? (Review of Logic and Society), Inquiry [23 (2):187-192]
Stinchcombe: Is the Prisoners' Dilemma all of Sociology?
Abstract
If social relations often require the choice of a cooperative solution to a prisoners'
dilemma, we must ask how people generally solve the games. Three possible devices are that those who choose non-cooperative strategies get a bad reputation and
so learn to be cooperative, that people are taught by parents that non-cooperators
have unhappy lives, or that an official can be paid a salary to make the cooperative
choice. By analyzing erotic love and marriage, and why people try to do their jobs,
it is suggested that these devices result in people often solving prisoners' dilemma
games without being conscious of them. How then do these structures that 'have
the function' of solving prisoners' dilemmas get created and maintain themselves?
It is suggested that Deweyan consciousness, existing only when structural strains or
unsolved games create personal problems, is adequate to explain many such functional structures.
Taylor, Michael (1986), Elster's Marx, Inquiry [29 (1):3-10]
Taylor: Elster's Marx
Abstract
A central aim of Elster's Making Sense of Marx is to recover Marx for
methodological individualism, to show that Marx, unlike many of his followers,
sought to provide his explanations of macro-phenomena with micro-foundations.
Though I largely share Elster's methodological commitments and his view that
Marx also (intermittently) adhered to them, I question whether this makes Marx a
methodological individualist. In my view, Marx practised in his best work both
individualist and structuralist explanation simultaneously. In three briefer remarks I
also comment on Marx's and Elster's treatment of the differences between workers'
and peasants' propensities for collective action; the primacy in Marx's theories of
dynamics internal to a society and his failure to recognize the importance for
domestic developments of interactions with other societies and states; and finally
Marx's 'progressive' values, which Elster seems to share.
Wilson, Thomas P. (1982), Social theory and modern logic: reflections on Elster's Logic and Society, Acta Sociologica [25 (4):431-441]
Wilson: Social Theory and Modern Logic
Abstract
This essay selectively reviews some major issues implicit in Elster's Logic
and Society. In particular, Elster's reliance on the utilitarian model of the
actor as the basis for general social theory, his assumption that modal
concepts can be reduced to extensional ones, and his adoption of the natural
science model raise fundamental problems for his general approach. Consequently, despite the fact that many of Elster's discussions of particular
examples are instructive and provocative, the work overall is disappointing.
Wood, Allen (1986), Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation, Inquiry [29 (1):11-27]
Wood: historical Materialism and Functional Explanation
Abstract
This paper is a critical examination of one central theme in Jon Elster's Making
Sense of Marx: Elster's defense of 'methodological individualism' in social science
and his related critique of Marx's use of 'functional explanation'. The paper does
not quarrel with Elster's claim that the particular instances of functional
explanation advanced by Marx are defective; what it criticizes is Elster's attempt to
raise principled, philosophical objections to this type of explanation in the social
sciences. It is argued that Elster's philosophical critique of functional explanation
rests on a caricature of this kind of explanation, just as his critique of Marx's use of
teleology in the philosophy of history rests on a caricature of the kinds of
teleological claims Marx is concerned to make. The paper ends with a brief
discussion of a recently published passage from Marx's notebooks of 1861-1863,
where Elster claims to have found Marx explicitly criticizing capitalist exploitation
as an injustice to the workers.
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